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Abstract
Most organizational theories argue that formal organizational structures de-
termine or at least inﬂuence individual behavior and therewith are crucial
for the performance and survival capability of the organization. This thesis
contributes to the research on cooperation in organizations by investigating
the eﬀects of basic elements of organizational structure within controlled lab-
oratory experiments. It provides insight into the underlying processes that
determine the team members’ responses to feedback information and to for-
mal structures of the decision environment. The organizational dilemma that
arises from team production - as a conﬂict between individual and collective
interests - provides the framework for the experiments presented in this thesis.
The results show that unconﬁned information that is available to every mem-
ber of a team might have detrimental eﬀects on cooperation over time while
retained or exaggerated information can foster and stabilize cooperation.
Cooperation, Organization, Public Good, Team Production, Monitoring,
Feedback, Leadership, Experiment
Zusammenfassung
Eine Vielzahl von Organisationstheorien geht davon aus, dass die formale
Struktur der Organisation das Verhalten der Organisationsmitglieder bestimmt
oder zumindest beeinﬂusst und damit von großer Bedeutung für die Leistungs-
und Überlebensfähigkeit der Organisation ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit leistet,
durch die Untersuchung der grundlegenden Elemente dieser formalen Struktur
in kontrollierten Laborexperimenten, einen Beitrag zum Verständnis von Ko-
operation in Organisationen. Die Ergebnisse erlauben einen Einblick in die zu-
grundeliegenden Prozesse, die die Reaktion der Teammitglieder auf Feedback-
Informationen und formale Strukturelemente bestimmen. Es zeigt sich, dass
die vollständige Information aller Teammitglieder negative Auswirkung auf den
Kooperationsverlauf haben kann, während zurückgehaltene bzw. geschönte In-
formationen die Kooperation verstärken und stabilisieren.
Kooperation, Organisation, Public Good, Teamproduktion, Beobachtung,
Feedback, Führung, Experiment
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Chapter 1
The eﬀect of observation and
rewards on cooperation1
. . . every team member would prefer a team in which no one, not
even himself, shirks . . . (Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz)
1.1 Introduction - Team production as social
dilemma
Team production, as described by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), is the joint
use of inputs that are owned by diﬀerent individuals. The result of team pro-
duction is for one thing characterized by the fact that it exceeds the sum of
individual contributions. At the same time the collective result does not allow
any conclusions about the team members’ marginal contribution. Therefore
observing the team output and rewarding the members with regard to their
collective result is no means to establish a reliable incentive structure. At
the same time another problem arises from the structure of team production.
Since the marginal contributions of the group members cannot be detected at
zero costs team production fosters free riding on other team members’ con-
tributions as long as the shirker can expect that the reduced team output is
not attributed to his action. In consequence, it is necessary to observe team
1 This chapter is based on the working paper “Does management matter? The inﬂuence of
observation and rewards on cooperative behaviour”, joint work with Bettina Rockenbach
and Peter Walgenbach. All authors contributed equally.
1
2 1. The eﬀect of observation and rewards on cooperation
members’ input behavior in order to establish a motivating connection be-
tween input and payoﬀ and to prevent free riding. According to Alchian and
Demsetz this should be done by a central monitor (hereafter the manager)
who is rewarded with the residual2 as an incentive for committed observation.
In addition the manager decides about the team members’ individual rewards
and owns the right to sanction uncooperative behavior. Although observing
input behavior and sanctioning shirking creates costs and therefore reduces the
beneﬁt of team members, they might agree to - or even choose - the appoint-
ment of a manager. Since “every team member would prefer a team in which
no one, not even himself, shirks”3 it seems plausible to expect the team mem-
bers’ willingness to comply with observation. We conducted an experiment to
investigate whether subjects.
A similar argumentation can be found in several theoretical and experimen-
tal studies concerning the provision of public goods. Subjects confronted with
the decision whether to invest their money in a public good or keep it for their
private utility tend to free (or cheap)4 ride on the contributions of their team
mates (Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). Every team member seeking indi-
vidual payoﬀ maximization will keep all units, such that the beneﬁcial team
output would not be produced. The most widespread means to counteract
this behavior in laboratory experiments is punishment, either by a centralized
institution or via decentralized peer-punishment that is executed directly by
the team mates. A second distinctive feature of sanction mechanisms is the
way they are implemented. It might be an exogenous part of the experimental
design or endogenously formed or chosen by the participants.
A ﬁrst strand of literature on punishment in voluntary contribution situ-
ations focuses on the exogenously imposed and decentralized alternative en-
forced by the group members themselves. Experimental results show that this
is a feasible mean to counteract free riding and supports stable cooperation
(Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; Fehr and Gächter 2000).
At the same time recent studies also point on the limits of peer-punishment
2 The manager’s residual is assumed to be created through the fact that his work reduces
shirking among the team members and therewith extends the team output.
3 Alchian and Demsetz (1972): 790
4 In contrast to the free rider the cheap rider does not contribute zero but tries to contribute
less than his teammates. There is experimental evidence that also a considerable number of
conditional contributors behaves this way (see for example Fischbacher and Gächter (2010)).
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and showed the problems and malfunctions around that mechanism, like re-
duced eﬃciency, misdirected and perverted punishment (Cinyabuguma, Page,
and Putterman 2006; Carpenter 2007; Nikiforakis 2008), or detrimental eﬀects
on altruistic cooperation (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003).
Another part of the literature focuses on centralized and exogenously im-
posed sanction. Two prominent examples of these mechanisms are the Groves-
Ledyard (Groves and Ledyard 1977) mechanism and the Falkinger mechanism.
The former was investigated by (Chen and Plott 1996) and appeared as a so-
lution for the free-riding problem as long as the punishment is suﬃciently
high. The Falkinger mechanism (Falkinger 1996; Falkinger, Fehr, Gächter,
and Winter-Ebmer 2000) also enhances cooperation by automatically reward-
ing players who contribute above the group average and punishing those who
contribute less than the average. Both mechanisms, however, ignore or at
least under represent the costs of implementing and enforcing the sanctioning
institution.
Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006) report similar results for an
endogenously chosen peer-punishment institution. The authors oﬀer the sub-
jects the opportunity to decide whether they play the public good game in a
sanction-free world or within an individual punishment environment. Like the
team members modeled by Alchian and Demsetz, the majority of the subjects
choose the institution that provides the possibility of observing and sanctioning
others behavior.
A study presented by Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2009) investigates the
endogenous formation of a centralized sanctioning institution and reveals that
subjects are able to successfully form such institutions and therefore increase
the eﬃciency of public good provision. In comparison to the afore-mentioned
sanction mechanisms this study uses a considerably stricter one. Once estab-
lished the institution does not allow any deviation from contributing the whole
endowment. In fact, the subjects do no longer choose the amount of tokens
they contribute but agree to stick to full contribution decision by voting for
the institution.
Following this classiﬁcation the design of our study can be described as an
endogenously chosen and centrally executed sanction mechanism. Unlike the
design presented by Kosfeld et al. (2009) the subjects in our study are not re-
4 1. The eﬀect of observation and rewards on cooperation
stricted to a certain contribution decision after electing the central institution.
In contrast to Fehr and Gächter (2000) and other peer-punishment exper-
iments the subjects participating in our study cannot individually sanction
uncooperative group members. Instead they can choose to assign this right
to a manager who is rewarded for observing the team members input. Unlike
most of the studies mentioned above, the sanction mechanism used here cannot
eﬃciently annihilate or create payoﬀ tokens. Instead the sanction mechanism
rewards the group member(s), who contributed the most by reallocating the
other part of the team surplus. The remaining part of the surplus is given to
the manager not only to represent the costs for sanctioning that are usually
considered in experiments. It is also given to take the costs of observing in-
dividual contribution into account that are regularly ignored when individual
information is exogenously provided at zero costs.5
In our study we address three main questions to shed some light on indi-
vidual behavior in a team production process modeled as a social dilemma sit-
uation. The ﬁrst question is whether the subjects actually are able to choose
an external institution that observes their input behavior and rewards high
contributors but at the same time reduces the net beneﬁts from team pro-
duction. This question is directly motivated by the argument that shirking
in team production necessarily leads to the need for a monitoring institution
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
The next question concerns the actual inﬂuence from an appointed manager
on team members’ input behavior. According to Alchian and Demsetz, the
existence of a manager will reduce or even eliminate shirking. In terms of the
public good game the consequence would be an increase in contributions.
Numerous experiments have shown that in the absence of any institutional
norms and regulations team performance and accordingly the provision of the
public goods is suboptimal and deteriorates over time (for an overview see
Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). On the other hand there is also an extensive
amount of literature providing evidence for the eﬀectiveness of punishment
mechanisms (see the examples above). In contrast to the eﬃcient annihilation
of payoﬀ tokens in that literature, we conjecture that a less rigorous sanction
5 In order to allow peer-punishment subjects need to know the individual contribution of their
team members. According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972) this information is not costless.
In fact it is part of the problem that creates the necessity of centralized monitoring.
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mechanism leads also to higher contributions and on top of that it avoids the
losses connected with punishment.
Finally, we will examine whether the manager’s inﬂuence on subjects’ con-
tribution behavior is altered by subjects’ voting decision. This could be the
case if the group members’ commitment to the team project is higher after ac-
tively voting for a central sanctioning institution than after voting against it.
Since deciding against a sanctioning institution seems to be a good predictor
for subjects’ intention to contribute zero or very small positive amounts (see
Gürerk et al. 2006), voting against the manager might also lead to a lower
level of individual cooperation.
The experimental design, that allows us to answer the questions stated
above and to test the conjectures of Alchian and Demsetz, is explained in the
next section 1.2. Additional predictions with regard to the social dilemma
structure of the game are described in section 1.3. We present the results in
section 1.4. They show that the theory of team production can be widely
conﬁrmed by our data. The possible reasons for the remaining diﬀerences are
discussed in the concluding section 1.5.
1.2 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was conducted in the eLab6 at the University of Erfurt. A
total of 96 students from diﬀerent disciplines participated in the experiment.
Students who had been involved in similar experiments were not allowed to
participate. The participants were randomly invited via Orsee (Greiner 2004)
and distributed to the control treatment and the two manager treatments. In
each treatment, we collected eight independent observations each with 4 sub-
jects. Each subject was placed in a cubicle equipped with a computer which
was connected to the experimenter’s server. The experimental software was
written with z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). The period payoﬀs were accumulated
to a total payoﬀ. The amount of earned tokens was converted into Euro at
an exchange rate of Euro 1 for 70 tokens and paid to the participants at the
end of the experiment. One experimental session lasted about an hour and
a half and subjects earned on average Euro 12.20. This basic design and the
6 Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
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described parameters were identical in all treatments. Written instructions
(see appendix A.1.1) were handed out to all subjects and read aloud by one
of the authors to publicly provide information about the payoﬀ function, indi-
vidual endowments and group size. All decisions and payoﬀs were completely
anonymous. Thus, the participants were not able to draw any conclusions on
the individual contribution of their group members in any treatment.
1.2.1 Control treatment (CT)
In each of the 20 identical rounds, each participant is endowed with 20 tokens
(ei) and then decides on the amount he or she wants to contribute (ci) to the
group project.7 Every token invested in the group project was deducted from
the contributor’s private account and generated a surplus for the entire group
(i.e. it was multiplied by 1.6). The group account was evenly distributed
among all four group members (N). Hence, subjects’ payoﬀs were known to be
calculated according to the following payoﬀ function:
Πi = ei − ci + Cj,withCj = 0.4
4∑
i=1
ci (1.1)
After all subjects had entered their decision, they were informed about their
individual payoﬀ and the sum of contributions in their group.
1.2.2 The manager treatments (M4 and M2)
The subject’s willingness to hand over the sanction possibilities to a manager
and the expected change in contribution behavior is investigated in two treat-
ments. Within each treatment the periods consist of two stages. The ﬁrst one
is identical with the situation described for the control treatment. The only
diﬀerence is the modiﬁcation of the multiplier (used to generate the surplus
of team production) in order to implement (diﬀerent) costs of monitoring into
the experiment. Therefore only the simple sum (1 out of 1.6) of contributions
is evenly distributed among the four team members. The remaining part of
the original multiplier (0.6 out of 1.6) is distributed between the manager and
those team member(s) who contribute the largest amount (n).
7 Only integer numbers between 0 and 20 were accepted as valid inputs.
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However, these changes did only take eﬀect if the members of a group de-
cided to hire the manager. The election was conducted with a simple majority
rule at the end of every round after all subjects were informed about the aver-
age contributions and their individual payoﬀ in the current period. If at least
3 out of 4 team members chose to vote for the manager, she was appointed for
the following period.
The distinguishing feature of the manager used in the two treatments is
the way she observes and rewards the team members’ behavior and the costs
caused by her work. In the M4 treatment, the manager observes the individual
contribution of every team member and reallocates 0.2 times the sum of all
contributions to those who contribute most. The remaining 0.4 represent her
costs and are taken by the manager.
In the M2 treatment this ratio is reversed, i.e., the costs for observing are
represented by one third of the team surplus (0.2) and the remaining surplus
(0.4) is distributed to the high contributors. As a consequence of the lower
costs the manager in this treatment is not able to observe every single con-
tribution decision. Actually she only reveals the contributions of two employ-
ees directly and guesses the remaining two by assuming that both unobserved
group members choose the same amount of tokens to put into the team project.
Knowing the sum of tokens invested to the group account she is than able to
rank the group member according to their contributions. Separating the sum
CT M4 M2
Manager available no yes yes
Marginal per capita return 0.4 0.25 0.25
Management costs 0.20 Ci 0.40 Ci
Reward for top contributor(s) 0.40 Ci/n 0.20 Ci/n
MPCR for one top contributor 0.45 Ci 0.65 Ci
Observed group members 4 2
Idependent observations 8 8 8
Table 1.1: Summary of treatment design
of contributions from the surplus generated by team production is equivalent
to the conception of the manager as residual claimant presented by Alchian
and Demsetz (1972). Although they assign the whole residual to the manager,
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Alchian and Demsetz (1972) also admit that she owns the right to reallocate
it to the team members. Moreover, giving the entire residual to the manager
would destroy the incentive structure of the public good game. Therefore the
surplus of team production is divided as described above to consider the costs
of management as well as the incentives for the team members. The treat-
ment variation can also be seen as diﬀerent quality levels of management with
respect to observation ability and costs. Table 1.1 summarizes the diﬀerent
treatment conditions.
1.3 Predictions
First of all we expect the contribution behavior in the control treatment (CT)
to be in line with former results (Ledyard 1995; Camerer 2003; Chaudhuri
2011), i.e. subjects start contributing a positive amount of tokens but decline
their contributions over time. As there are no means to assist or force cooper-
ation there is no reason to expect higher contributions or stable cooperation
in this repeated game.
1.3.1 Voting and contribution incentives
To appraise the rate and stability of cooperation in the manager treatments it
is necessary to take a closer look on the voting incentives given by the exper-
imental design. As the initial payoﬀ function (1.1) is altered in the manager
treatments with regard to the manager’s appointment, the participants should
have clear preferences for certain states of design given their original contribu-
tion preferences. These contribution preferences are regularly used to classify
subjects as free riders or conditional contributors (see for exapmple Fischbacher
and Gächter 2010).8 While the free rider contributes nothing at all and takes
advantage of other group members’ input, the conditional contributor matches
the other members’ contributions over the entire strategy space. We restrict
the description of the incentives on those two types of players.
8 There is at least one other observable type of player that is characterized by a hump shaped
response function, i.e. they behave like conditional cooperators until the median of the
strategy space is reached and thereafter steadily reduce their contribution. Since only a
smaller number of subjects reveal such preferences (about 14% reported in Fischbacher,
Gächter, and Fehr (2001)) we forego the further considering of this type of player.
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Since the initial and alternate state and the corresponding payoﬀs are com-
mon knowledge every subject can calculate its beneﬁt from acting in one or
another state. In all treatments the payoﬀ function is given by equation 1 as
long as there is no manager hired. The payoﬀ function in M4 is given by equa-
tion 1.2 if the manager is hired where n is the number of top contributors. In
the treatment with a manager who observes only two team members directly
(M2) the payoﬀ function is given by equation 1.3 as long as the manager is
active.
Πi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ei − ci + 14Cj + 0.2n Cj, for (one of) the top contributors
ei − ci + 14Cj, for all other group members
(1.2)
Πi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ei − ci + 14Cj + 0.4n Cj, for (one of) the top contributors
ei − ci + 14Cj, for all other group members
(1.3)
The last term in equation 1.2 and 1.3 is only paid to the subject(s) with the
highest contribution. If the manager identiﬁes two or more subjects as the top
contributors, this part of the surplus is evenly divided among those players.
In general every subject that expects its own contribution to be marginally
higher than the positive contribution from the second-best teammate should
prefer (see 1.4: MPCR 0.4 < 0.45) the existence of a manager. Because for
every Cj > 0 the proﬁt Πi* is always higher than the proﬁt Πi (see equation
1.4). In contrast to that, every subject that expects its own contribution to be
as high as the one form the second-best teammate has no incentive to vote for
the manager (see 1.5 MPCR 0.4 > 0.35) in M4. In M2 the incentive to vote
persist as long as the number of top contributors is smaller than three (MPCR
0.4 > 0.383).
The free-rider has no incentive at all to vote for the manager because both
sanction mechanisms (M2 and M4) reduce the possibility to beneﬁt from the
others contributions (MPCR 0.4 > 0.25). From that point of view voting for
the manager can also be seen as a means to discipline free-riding group mem-
bers if we allow for social preferences. Assuming that a subject is inequity
avers and suﬀers if other group members receive higher payoﬀs than the sub-
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ject itself (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000); than the
appointment of a manager oﬀers contributors an additional way to ease their
possible suﬀering from payoﬀ disadvantages. Besides reducing the inequity by
lowering the own contribution, cooperative players can shorten the distance to
the free riders by (partly) excluding them from the beneﬁts of the team project
and use the potential observation as a threat of punishment.
Πi = ei − ci + 0.4Cj < Πi∗ = ei − ci + 0.25Cj + 0.20Cj (1.4)
Πi = ei − ci + 0.4Cj < Πi∗ = ei − ci + 0.25Cj + 0.22 Cj (1.5)
Nevertheless, the original Nash equilibrium of the public good game is not
altered by one of the presented designs (M4 and M2). Voting against the man-
ager and contributing nothing is the only strategy that leads to strategically
stable payoﬀs.
The alternative strategy to contribute marginally above the second-best
contributor (to gain the additional part of the surplus) does not lead to a
higher payoﬀ until the sum of other contributions (C−i) is larger than 2.75
times the own contribution in M4 (C−i > 0.875ci in M2, see Appendix A.2.1).
If this is common knowledge every subject has an incentive to deviate by
contributing one additional token to become the only top contributor (1.6 is
always smaller than 1.7). Given the limited strategy space (0-20 tokens), this
incentive does no longer exist if everybody contributes the entire endowment.
Πi = ei − ci + 0.25Cj + 0.4
n
Cj,with n > 1 (1.6)
Π∗i = ei − (ci + 1) + 0.25(Cj + 1) +
0.4
n∗
(Cj + 1),with n∗ = 1 (1.7)
However, at this point each subject has an incentive to free-ride. If this again
is common knowledge no subject has incentive to vote for the manager and
as consequence there is also no incentive to contribute anything. Due to the
managers estimation in the M2 treatment it is possible that a high contributor
is not rewarded if the manager guesses his contribution together with the con-
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tribution of a free rider. Since the observed subjects are randomly chosen and
the players do not know the probability of being observed, the only diﬀerence
to M4 is an additional uncertainty that does not change the incentives for a
rational, selﬁsh, and risk-neutral player.
Beside these formal incentives provided by the experimental design there
might be also a more implicit inﬂuence from the vote for a central sanctioning
authority. Considering the voting decisions as a signal or a promise for higher
contributions might also help to overcome the dilemma structure of the public
good game and stabilize the cooperation within the teams. The results pre-
sented by Gürerk et al. (2006) show that the initial contributions are higher
after the subjects entered the sanction world although they had not yet ex-
perienced any punishment. A deliberate vote for an institution that observes
and judges all team members could not only be seen as a means to discipline
the others but also as a way to establish cooperation as a social norm that
binds the voting subject. On the other hand it is also conceivable that the
announcement eﬀect of the vote is strategically abused by the free riders to
misguide the team mates and beneﬁt from their higher contributions.
Πi = ei − ci + 1.44 Cj +
0.2
n
Cj − 0.44 Cj < (1.8)
Π∗i = ei − (ci + 1) +
1.4
4 (Cj + 1) +
0.4
n∗
(Cj + 1) − 0.44 (Cj + 1) (1.9)
Up to now we focused on the incentives created by the rewards but as a con-
sequence of the payoﬀ function (see 1.2 and 1.3) the management costs rise
together with the contributions. Every additional token contributed to the
team project enlarges the manager’s share of the team surplus by 0.4 token in
M4 and by 0.2 in M2. Equation 1.8 (with n∗ = 1) shows that the best response
function described above persists because the monitoring costs, just like the
sum of contributions, are equally divided among the team members. In the
M4 treatment (0.4), as well as in M2 (0.2), the marginal increase in the costs
is always below the marginal increase in the share of the sum of contributions.
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As shown in equation (1.10), the same applies for the group payoﬀ.
Πj = Ej − Cj + 1.4Cj + 0.2Cj − 0.4Cj (1.10)
Π∗i = ei − (ci + 1) +
1.4
4 (Cj + 1) +
0.4
n∗
(Cj + 1) − 0.44 (Cj + 1) (1.11)
Again the marginal increase in the sum of contributions exceeds the one in
monitoring costs. Nevertheless the group, as well as every team member, is
better oﬀ if the same contributions are provided without monitoring.
Considering the voting and contribution incentives explained above, former
experimental results (especially Gürerk et al. 2006; Kosfeld et al. 2009) and
the signaling eﬀect just mentioned there are several conceivable scenarios for
the repeated game.
1.3.2 Cooperation without manager
If the very possibility of implementing a central sanctioning institution fosters
cooperation, subjects should choose to contribute more in the manager treat-
ments than in the control treatment without any voting. Fehr and Gächter
(2002) report a similar eﬀect if subjects have the opportunity to punish uncoop-
erative behavior by reducing the free riders payoﬀ. Even the mere opportunity
of punishment fosters cooperation and reduces the number of free riding deci-
sions in the early repetitions of the game. In this case even the teams’ payoﬀ
will be higher than in CT since no costs accrue for observation and rewarding.
According to what is known from the afore-mentioned repeated public good
experiments this should not prevent contributions from declining over time.
Therefore the positive inﬂuence from potential observation and sanctioning
should not rule out actual manager appointments.
1.3.3 Cooperaration with manager
If there is no positive eﬀect from potential observation, subjects should recog-
nize a declining amount of contributions already in the ﬁrst periods (Ledyard
1995; Chaudhuri 2011). The non-free-riding team members might then start
voting for the manager and compete for the surplus generated and exclude the
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free-riders. Fehr and Gächter (2002) report that subjects are willing to coun-
teract uncooperative behavior even if this reduces their own payoﬀs. If the
manager is appointed subjects might raise their contributions to be rewarded
by the manager (see equation 1.8). If players do not care about the costs
and do not contribute their entire endowment, they might continue voting for
the manager and remain on a high level of cooperation but on a low level of
eﬃciency in terms of group payoﬀ.
This case might occur as long as subjects’ disutility from payoﬀ inequity
outruns the costs of observation. Since the degree of aversion against pay-
oﬀ inequity diﬀers between the subjects (especially Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) it can only be used to explain subjects behavior if
the individual parameters are elicited. For that reason we forego the further
consideration of these models and leave this question open to further research.
1.3.4 Cooperaration beyond manager
An alternative path might be reached if subjects realize the cost advantage of
cooperation without observation. After some rounds under observation players
may ﬁnd the contributions considerably higher while the manager is hired
and they compete for the surplus (see equation 1.8). From here on, subjects
do not necessarily need to continue with permanent monitoring to establish
cooperation. They also might skip the monitoring to save costs and rely on
the threat of future manager engagements as described above. In contrast
to the contribution without manager situation, the threat of reappointing the
manager might have a stronger inﬂuence on contributions since the free riders
already experienced the sanction mechanism.
To sum up our predictions, with regard to our research question stated at
the end of section 1.1, we expect a frequent use of the sanctioning institution
in both manager treatments and a higher number of manager appointment in
M2 where the costs incurred by the manager are lower. Regarding the second
research question we expect subjects’ contributions to be higher whenever the
group is under observation. Further we expect the contributions in the man-
ager treatments to be higher than in the control treatment even if the manager
is actually not hired. Finally we expect the managers’ positive inﬂuence to be
higher on those subjects who actually voted for his appointment.
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1.4 Results
The ﬁrst question to answer is whether the subjects are really willing to put
themselves under the observation of the central sanctioning authority. Figure
1.1 shows the relative frequency of positive votes and actual manager appoint-
ments. The diﬀerences between M2 and M4 are signiﬁcant for the positive
votes (p < 0.001)9 as well as the number of actual manager appointments
(p < 0.001). The gap between votes and appointments in M4 is can be ex-
plained as result of the strict voting rule.10 The diﬀerence in manager appoint-
ments between M4 and M2 supports the assumption that subjects are aware
of the costs of control. After all it can be stated that considerable number of
subjects indeed complies with the observation by a manager as it is predicted
by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). According to our predictions (see equation
1.6) this also points to subjects’ intention to contribute some positive amount
of token to the public good.
42%
58%
17%
44%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
M4 M2
R
el
at
iv
e 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Treatment
positive voting decissions
monitor assignments
Figure 1.1: Positive voting decisions and manager appointment in M4 and M2
Taking a closer look to the voting decisions in the particular groups reveals
that subjects are not able to coordinate on a stable use of the manager. On
average the manager observes only 1.08 rounds in a row in the M4 treatment
9 All comparisons between two independent Samples are tested with a Mann-Whitney-U-test
(exact), two-tailed
10 In the M4 treatment 21% and in the M2 treatment 18% of the positive votes vanish in tie
results.
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and 1.74 rounds in M2. The longest employment lasted 5 rounds and was
reached only once by a single group in the M2 treatment.
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Figure 1.2: Manager appointment over time in M4 and M2
At the same time the number of rounds without observation between two
manager appointments is 2.8 (M4) and 1.65 (M2) on average. One group in
the M4 treatment played the entire experiment without appointing the man-
ager. Figure 1.2 shows the number of groups that appointed a manager in the
particular round and conﬁrms the alternating pattern from described above.
It also reveals a remarkable increase of manager appointment in M2 between
the ﬁrst and the second half of the game. The corresponding nonparametric
test conﬁrms the diﬀerence at p < 0.05.11
In the following part of the result section we compare the eﬀect from of
observation within the two manager treatments as well as between those and
the control treatment.
Figure 1.3 shows the average contributions in the control treatment and
the ones in M4 which are divided in contribution decisions under observation
and those that have been done in the absence of a manager. It should be
mentioned that the lines in Figure 1.3 as well as the group averages used in the
Mann-Whitney-U-test consist of diﬀerent numbers of independent observations
11All comparisons between two related samples are tested with a Wilcoxon-signed-rank test
(exact), two tailed
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depending on whether the group hired a manager or not.12 Therefore the
dashed line - representing contributions under observation - is disconnected
for some rounds. Comparing the contributions in CT and M4 conﬁrms the
assumption that the existence of manager raises the cooperation rate. On
average the contributions in M4 (6.9) are signiﬁcantly higher (p < 0.01) than
in the control treatment (3.8). This diﬀerence also maintains if we focus on
the groups that did not hire a manager in the M4 treatment. Even without
actual observation subjects contributed signiﬁcantly more (p < 0.05) in M4
(6.5) than in CT. In other words, the mere opportunity of observation and
rewarding fosters cooperation.
0
5
10
15
1 5 10 15 20
Av
er
ag
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
Round
M4 with manager
M4 without manager
CT
Figure 1.3: Average contributions in M4 and CT
Comparing the contributions within the M4 treatment reveals an additional
increase in cooperation. If the manager is actually hired by the majority of
one group the average input to the public good is 8.7 (44%) and therewith
signiﬁcantly above (p < 0.05) the average in the same group without obser-
vation. It is important to mention again that there are two groups in the M4
treatment that never agreed on hiring a manager. Nonetheless those subjects
contributed 7.8 (39%) token on average and therewith match the treatment
average.
12To dispel the worries about the equal variances assumption underlying the U-test, we con-
ducted some Levene-tests and ﬁnd the smallest probability > F at 0.272. Therefore we keep
the H0 of equal variances and use the U-test to compare means.
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In the next step we present the results of the M2 treatment in which the
manager does only claim 0.2 of the surplus but on the other hand only ob-
serves one half of the group members and guesses the contributions from the
other half. The pattern is similar to the one from M4. Again the average
contributions (8.6 or 43%) are signiﬁcantly higher (p < 0.001) compared to
the control treatment and also the contributions without observation (6.8 or
34%) are above (p < 0.001) the values in CT.
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Figure 1.4: Average contributions in M2 and CT
As can be seen from Figure 1.4 the subjects in M2 contribute surprisingly
high amounts of tokens (11.2 or 56%)13 , if the manager is actually hired al-
though the incentives for being the top contributor are below those in M4, since
the manager might ignore the high contributor by guessing his contribution
together with the one provided by a free rider.
To disentangle the diﬀerence between the positive eﬀects of observation
from the experience gained from the feedback about other group members
contributions during the experiment we focus on the contribution diﬀerence in
the ﬁrst round when a group hires a manager. We ﬁnd that in both manager
treatments the average contributions raise with the manager’s ﬁrst entry.
While Table 1.2 reveals that the vast majority of subjects in both treatments
contribute more if the manager comes into play for the ﬁrst time, Table 1.3
13Which is again signiﬁcantly above the contributions in CT. p < 0.001
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shows a completely contrary result. As stated above, the manager was only
hired for one round and subjects had to vote again in order to keep him or
her employed or otherwise play along without observation. In the latter case
subjects drop their contributions back to the original level.
Average group contribution
last round ﬁrst round diﬀerence
without manager with manager (p-value)
M4 8.4 12.2 3.8 (<0.05)
M2 6.8 11.7 4.9 (<0.01)
Subjects’ response to managers entry
contribute more no change contribute less
M4 63% 8% 29%
M2 72% 6% 22%
Table 1.2: Responses to managers’ ﬁrst entry
This phenomenon does not only occur during the manager’s ﬁrst appearance
but also in all later rounds.14 Thus, subjects’ behavior creates a pattern of al-
ternating between rounds without manager and low contributions and rounds
with manager and high contributions. Comparing the subjects’ decisions be-
fore and after the manager is active reveals that going back to the situation
without observation drops the contributions even behind the ones before the
appointments of the manager. Although the diﬀerences are quite small in both
treatments (0.41 in M4 and 0.42 in M2) this eﬀect is signiﬁcant (p < 0.01 in
M4 and p < 0.1 in M2) and none of the 14 relevant groups contributed more
than they did before they hired the manager.
Up to now we showed that the existence of a manager as well as his or her
actual appointment fosters contributions in a public-good game. But being
observed by a manager does not aﬀect all subjects in the same way. Table 3
shows the results of a regression analysis that describes subjects’ contribution
as a function of time (round), initial contribution, feedback and observation
by the manager.
14The average contributions in the last round before a manager was hired are 6.31 in M4
and 6.07 in M2. During the rounds with an active manager the subjects contributed 9.26
(respectively 11.53 in M2) on average. In the ﬁrst round after the manager was not hired
again the average contributions dropped back to 5.89 (5.64). The increase as well as the
later degrease is signiﬁcant in both treatments at least at the 5% level.
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Average group contribution
last round ﬁrst round diﬀerence
with manager without manager (p-value)
M4 11.1 7.7 3.8 (<0.05)
M2 11.8 7.2 4.6 (<0.05)
Subjects’ response to managers exit
contribute more no change contribute less
M4 25% 0% 75%
M2 19% 9% 72%
Table 1.3: Responses to managers’ ﬁrst exit
The initial contribution preference is operationalized as the subjects’ uncon-
ditional contribution in the ﬁrst round and feedback is the average contribution
of the other group members in the previous round. The manager variable sim-
ply indicates whether a manager is hired or not. As can be seen from Table 1.4
manager’s inﬂuence on subjects’ contribution is signiﬁcantly higher if the sub-
ject himself voted for her appointment while those subjects who voted against
the manager raise their contributions to a lesser extent.
Dv: contribution Spec I (N = 608) Spec II (N = 608)
Round -0.155*** (0.045) -0.157*** (0.045)
First contribution 0.557*** (0.110) 0.553*** (0.113)
Feedback 0.037 (0.059) 0.039 (0.059)
Manager 5.117*** (0.639)
Vote for hired manager 5.501*** (1.040)
Vote against hired manager 3.707*** (1.017)
Cons 2.779*** (0.981) 2.796*** (0.971)
R2 0.29 0.30
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clusters in groups)
in parentheses,* sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%. The Wald-test
rejects the H0 of equal coeﬃcients (Vote for the hired manager and Vote against the
hired manager) at the 5% level. Since there is no suﬃcient number of observations of
contributions with manager in M4,we only use the data from M2. (for M4 see A.1.3)
Table 1.4: Managers’ inﬂuence on contributions
The regression also shows that the typical inﬂuence from the feedback about
others players’ previous contributions (see Fischbacher and Gächter 2010) is
suppressed by the managers’ impact. Instead of adapting their contributions
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towards other group members’ behavior, subjects focus on whether their con-
tribution is observed or not. As a consequence the downward trend in contribu-
tions, which results from contribution adaption towards the feedback, might
be stopped or at least slowed down. If subjects do not consider their team
mates’ contribution decisions in the usual extent, the average contributions in
later rounds should not be lower than those in the ﬁrst rounds.
The results presented in Table 1.5 conﬁrm that there is indeed no decline in
subjects’ contributions over time as long as the manager is hired.15 In contrast
to that the downward trend also persists in M2 if the manager is not active.
Dv: contribution CT M2 without manager M2 with manager
(N = 640) (N = 372) (N = 268)
Round -0.254*** -0.245*** -0.002
(0.046) (0.029) (0.100)
Cons 6.486*** 8.938*** 11.287***
(0.536) (0.294) (1.115)
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clusters in groups) in
parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at %. Since there is no suﬃcient
number of observations of contributions with manager in M4, we only use the data from
M2. (for M4 see A.1.4)
Table 1.5: Downward trend in contributions
The next step is to investigate the managers’ impact in terms of costs and
eﬃciency. As described in section 1.2 the management costs are borne by
the group members since one part of the return from their contributions is
allocated to the manager. Thus the positive eﬀect on average contributions is
opposed by the managers’ claim on subjects’ payoﬀs.
Since the surplus from the public good is completely allocated to the four
group members in the control treatment (2.29) they receive a signiﬁcantly
higher (p < 0.05) average return than the participants in the M4 treatment
(1.37). In contrast to that, the total return in M4 (3.6) is signiﬁcantly higher
(p < 0.05) than in the control treatment. Due to the fact that the manager
receives almost two third of the return the subjects’ payoﬀs fall behind CT
although their contributions are much higher.
As can be also seen from Figure 5 the participants in M2 receive the highest
15This result can also be found by using the complete number of observations in M2 and the
interaction between time (round) and manager appointments as independent variable.
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share in return and generate an overall return that is well above those in the
other treatments. The diﬀerence in members’ share in return between M2 and
CT (as well as the diﬀerence between M2 and M4) is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.
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Figure 1.5: Average contributions in M2 and CT
The same is true for the whole return from the public-good game. Thus
there is not only a payoﬀ advantage for the entire group (included the manager
who receives about 52% of the return) but also for the team members albeit the
subjects do not beneﬁt to the same extent. Actually the variance in payoﬀs is
even higher in the M2 treatment (compared to CT p < 0.05). That is the low
contributor takes more advantage from exploiting the high contributor than in
CT, although he is (partly) excluded from the return. Additional support for
this result comes from a comparison of variances within the treatments and
between the states of observation. In both treatments, the variance in contri-
butions (and in payoﬀs) is signiﬁcantly higher (p < 0.05 in both treatments) if
the manager is hired. According to our predictions derived from equation 1.4
and 1.5 the diﬀerent contribution preferences should lead to diﬀerent voting
preferences. Our data supports this prediction at least for the ﬁrst voting de-
cision. We ﬁnd a positive correlation (0.394)16 between subjects’ contribution
in the ﬁrst period and the vote they stated afterwards. The regression anal-
16Spearman-Rho, p < 0.05, two-tailed
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ysis17 shows that subjects’ ﬁrst choice has a positive inﬂuence on later voting
decisions. In line with the afore-mentioned pattern of alternating manager
appointment the regression also shows a negative inﬂuence from current mon-
itoring. Given our data and the experimental design the question who votes
for the manager cannot be conclusively answered. The elicitation of subjects’
contribution preferences and beliefs about other team members’ contributions
in future experiments might help to close this gap. Compared to the widely
used peer punishment mechanism (Fehr and Gächter 2002), the reallocation
of the team surplus presented in this study beneﬁts from reducing the payoﬀ
inequality from both directions. For one side the free riders are excluded from
the surplus of team production. At the same time cooperative team members
are compensated for the disutility they get from being exploited by the free
riders. According to a theory of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) it
matters whether the payoﬀ distance is reduced by lowering the free riders’ pay-
oﬀ or by increasing the contributors’ payoﬀ. Since the subjects’ utility function
is assumed to be only partly determined by the relative payoﬀs, every increase
in subjects own payoﬀ increases subjects’ utility more than a corresponding re-
duction of the payoﬀs for the free rider. The usual peer punishment mechanism
reduces other team members’ payoﬀ as well as subjects own payoﬀ regardless
of the punishment eﬃciency. In consequence the utility gain provided through
peer punishment is lower than the corresponding utility gain from a sanction
mechanism that tackles payoﬀ inequity from both directions.
1.5 Conclusion
We present the results of an experiment conducted to test the predictions of a
theory of team production introduced by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Based
on a public-good game our design allows us to observe the actual willingness
to be monitored by a manager and his inﬂuence on cooperation within the
team. Our results support the assumption that team members indeed prefer
the appointment of a manager if they had experienced free riding among their
teammates before. We also ﬁnd that the amount of compliance is reduced if
monitoring costs are higher.
17For the detailed results of the probit regression see Appendix A.1.5
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With view to the managers’ inﬂuence on cooperation our results show that
even the mere possibility of observation and sanctioning fosters contributions
which rise again after the team members decided to hire a manager. We
also ﬁnd that subjects are not able to coordinate on hiring the manager on
a regular basis. Instead they alternate their voting decisions as well as their
contributions. One possible explanation can be found in the opposed voting
incentives for diﬀerent types of players. Although conditional contributors can
hire the manager to discipline the free (or cheap) riders, they are better oﬀ if
they provide the same amount of contributions without bearing the monitoring
costs.
The positive inﬂuence of monitoring receives a drawback from the increasing
variances in contributions and payoﬀs. Although the average contributions
are higher in the presence of a manager, this does not lead to homogeneous
cooperation. The comparatively weak punishment of free riders might explain
this result. An additional treatment that uses the team surplus to punish the
free riders instead of rewarding the high contributors could shed some light on
this question.
Further insight into subjects’ motives could be gained from the elicitation
of contribution preferences and beliefs. Therewith it seems possible to answer
the question whether the manager as described by Alchian and Demsetz is able
to change the employees’ attitude towards the organization beyond the short
term changes in cooperative behavior.
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Chapter 2
The eﬀect of feedback on
conditional cooperation1
Silence is a source of great strength. (Lao Tzu)
2.1 Introduction - Feedback information
Feedback about one’s own decisions and especially about the decisions of rel-
evant others is supposed to be an element of vital importance in many social
interactions. Organizational theories emphasize its inﬂuence on team perfor-
mance and organizational learning (Greve 2003; Vegt, Jong, Bunderson, and
Molleman 2010). Educational sciences also point to the beneﬁcial eﬀects of
feedback on sustainable learning success (Metcalfe, Kornell, and Finn 2009)
and politi-cal sciences emphasize its importance for the viability of democracy
(Easton 1975; Soss and Schram 2007). Immediate feedback is also one of basic
elements of almost all repeated experiments in economic research and partic-
ularly in repeated public good games. Information about the other players’
behavior is crucial for most economic theories of cooperation in social dilemma
situations. It can be considered as a stylized fact that cooperation in repeated
social dilemma situations diminishes over time, if there are no means to enforce
it or to punish uncooperative actions (for a survey see Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri
2011). There are several competing approaches to explain this phenomenon.
1 This chapter is based on the working paper “Delayed feedback and conditional cooperation
in repeated public good games.”, joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and Peter Walgenbach.
All authors contrib-uted equally.
25
26 2. The eﬀect of feedback on conditional cooperation
One of the most frequently investigated explanation is that (I) people coop-
erate as long as they observe cooperation among the other group members2
and reduce their contributions, as soon as the others do so. However, they
do not perfectly match the others contribution. Instead they are supposed to
display a selﬁsh bias and contribute less than they observe (or expect) from
others. The alternative approaches either invoke (II) erroneous3 or (III) strate-
gic4 behavior, which induces positive contributions in early stages but vanishes
in later repetitions. In each of these models the feedback information about
others’ behavior (or payoﬀ) plays a crucial role, either as a necessity for belief
updating or as an accelerator of equilibrium learning. We forego to consider
further approaches like altruism (Andreoni 1993) and commitment (Bordignon
1990), since these models explain positive contributions as a deviation from
the perfect rational and selﬁsh payoﬀ maximization rather than the decline of
cooperation in repeated games.
Our study is focused on diminishing contributions through (imperfect) con-
ditional cooperation, as described by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010)5 and our
research questions aim at the three basic elements that are considered in that
model to explain the downward trend in repeated public good games. The ﬁrst
question investigates the role of feedback about others’ contributions (I) that is
necessary to update beliefs. Second, we investigate the eﬀect of the elicitation
of beliefs (II) that is known to aﬀect subjects’ contribution decisions in both
directions. And ﬁnally, we explore subjects’ contribution preferences (III) that
are supposed to be the main reason for the downward trend because they are
selﬁshly biased.
We use a standard repeated public good game (see section 2.2 for details)
and extend the basic design in two directions. For one thing we implement a
delayed feedback by adding further repetitions after a ﬁrst phase without feed-
back (I). In addition, we vary the frequency of the elicitation of beliefs in order
2 see for example Keser and Van Winden (2000); Fischbacher et al. (2001); Croson (2007);
Gächter (2007); Ashley, Ball, and Eckel (2010); Fischbacher and Gächter (2010)
3 Andreoni (1988); Sonnemans, Schram, and Oﬀerman (1999)
4 Kreps, Milgrom, and RobertsRobert (1982); Andreoni (1995); Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997)
5 Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt, and Loos (2009) investigate the predictions of the three models
in a public goods experiment with and without feedback information and do not ﬁnd any
support for the hypotheses of erroneous or strategic play. In line with Croson (2007) they
identify conditional cooperation (reciprocity) and adaptive belief learning as the mainsprings
of diminishing cooperation in repeated social dilemma situations.
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to investigate the inﬂuence of explicit reﬂection about others’ contribution be-
havior (II). Our results show that missing feedback interrupts the downward
trend while delayed feedback hardly changes the decline in contributions. The
results also show that subjects are not per se selﬁshly biased. The majority
of subjects (about 70%) starts as perfect conditional contributors and stick
to their preference until the end of the experiment. The remaining subjects
contribute considerably less than they expect from other.
In the next section (2.2) we will discuss the related literature and describe
the predictions and research questions derived from the model and the exper-
imental results mentioned there. The main design elements are described in
section 2.3 and the experimental results are analyzed and discussed in section
(2.4). Section 2.5 provides a concluding discussion and implications for further
research.
2.2 Related literature and research questions
The standard linear public good game faces the subjects with the following
decision situation. The participants are randomly matched into groups of 4
players. Each player is endowed with 20 tokens (ei) and asked to decide to
either keep them or to contribute (ci) them to a group project. The subjects
can keep or contribute every integer amount between 0 and 20 tokens. Every
token that is invested to the group project yields a marginal social beneﬁt of
1.6 tokens, which is equally divided among the group members. Therefore, the
marginal private return from every invested token is 0.4. If the game is played
repeatedly, subjects receive feedback before they have to decide again. The
payoﬀ structure is summarized by the following function 2.1:
Πi = ei − ci + Cj, with Cj = 0.4
4∑
i=1
ci (2.1)
The homo economicus in a public-good game is neither inﬂuenced by any
feedback nor does he adjust his behavior towards his or her beliefs about the
other players’ contribution. This completely rational and selﬁsh player would
simply contribute nothing. Therefore, the Nash-equilibrium in the one-shot
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game and also in every single stage of a ﬁnitely repeated game will be no
cooperation at all (Shapiro 1989). As mentioned above, numerous laboratory
public-good experiments draw a diﬀerent picture. Subjects typically start with
contributing about one half of their endowment to the public good and keep
the other half in their private account. Without any cooperation enforcing
mechanisms, like punishment or rewards, but with regular feedback about
others’ contributions, subjects start to decrease their input in later repetitions
until there is almost no cooperation at the end of the game (Ledyard 1995;
Chaudhuri 2011).
Adaptive belief learning and diminishing cooperation
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) (hereafter FG) explain the downward trend
in contributions over time with a two-stage model that is described in the
following section. Subjects’ beliefs about their teammates’ next contributions
are described as a function (2.2) of their previous beliefs (belieft−1) and the
feedback about the group members’ previous contributions.
belieft = α1belieft−i + α2feedback (2.2)
The contributions in turn are determined by subjects’ belief (belieft) and
their predicted contribution derived from their contribution preferences that
are elicited at the beginning of the game.
contributiont = β1belieft + β2predictedcontribution (2.3)
To elicit contribution preferences, the participants are asked to state their
response on each average contribution (0-20 token) via the strategy method
(Selten 1967). According to FG, these response functions reveal that condi-
tional contribution is imperfect, i.e. subjects contribute below average contri-
butions from the remaining group members. Therefore, FG argue that it is
not necessary to assume free-riding since the conditional cooperators itself fos-
ter the downward trend through their selﬁshly biased behavior. By simulating
subjects’ behavior, based on the revealed contribution preferences, the authors
identify this behavior as the main reason for declining contributions, even in
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the absence of free-riders (for details see Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).
According to this model, the given feedback does not directly enter subjects’
contribution decision but is mediated through the beliefs about other players’
contributions. At this point it seems plausible to assume that missing feedback
will interrupt the process of belief forming and diminishing cooperation (2.2).
Without any information about the group members’ behavior, the subjects are
neither able to update their beliefs nor is there any necessity to adapt con-
tributions in later repetitions because the individual contribution preference
should not change during the experiment. Therefore subjects’ average behav-
ior should remain on the initial level in terms of contributions as well as with
view to the beliefs. It is important to mention that FG use their model to
explain the behavior, which is observed in a stranger setting, i.e. the groups
were randomly recomposed in every repetition. Thus subjects not only have
to update their beliefs with view to their group members’ behavior but also
with respect to the actions of players that participate in the actual session.
However the experimental results, presented to describe subjects’ behavior
in repeated games without feedback, are ambiguous and do not show a clear
pattern. Sell and Wilson (1991) designed one of the early public goods exper-
iments with diﬀerent feedback conditions without observing subjects’ beliefs.6
The authors report no contribution diﬀerences between the no information
condition and the treatment with aggregated feedback information. They also
report a downward trend in contributions in the no feedback condition. Weber
(2003) presents the results of a repeated guessing game under no information
conditions and shows that subjects’ decisions are not stable but instead con-
verge towards the predicted equilibrium without any feedback about other
players’ decisions. In contrast to Sell and Wilson (1991) he reports a signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between the treatment with regular feedback and those without
feedback. The decline in subjects’ choices over time is reported to be slower in
the absence of feedback. In terms of a public good game, this might point to a
(slow) decline in contributions even without information about other players,
if subjects ’learn’ to free-ride by simple repetition (Andreoni 1988). Again in
contrast to Sell and Wilson (1991), the recent study presented by Neugebauer
6 The authors compared the contributions in a repeated 4-person public-good game between
the following three information conditions: (I) no information about other players’ contri-
butions, (II) aggregate information and (III) individual information.
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et al. (2009) reports no signiﬁcant decline in contributions, if there is no feed-
back about other group members’ behavior.7 The authors also record subjects’
beliefs in every repetition of the game and report no change in the distance
between beliefs and contributions over time.
On the other hand, there is also experimental evidence that uncertainty,
which necessarily occurs in the absence of feedback information, reduces co-
operative behavior in public-goods games. Wit and Wilke (1998) demonstrate
that social uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about their partners’ cooperative be-
havior, has detrimental eﬀects on cooperation. Wit and Wilke (1998) show
that contributions are lower if the uncertainty about the outcome of the pub-
lic good increases. A further study by Brennan, González, Guth, and Levati
(2008) reveals a negative correlation between contributions and risk level in a
public-good game. Finally, the results presented in chapter 4 provide further
support for the detrimental eﬀect of uncertainty on contributions. It turns out
that subjects reduce their contributions, if the feedback information is fraught
with uncertainty.
After all, it can be stated that missing feedback might aﬀect cooperation
in repeated interactions from two directions. On the one hand it interrupts
adaptive belief learning and might therewith stop the decline in contributions;
one the other hand it induces uncertainty that is known to lower contributions.
Therefore we expect the contributions under missing feedback conditions to be
stable over time but not considerably above those under regular feedback.
With view to the uncertainty and our second research question, it might be
expected that the elicitation of beliefs contributes to a stabilization of coopera-
tion. If subjects are repeatedly asked to state their expectations about others’
contributions, they might use their beliefs to justify their own behavior and
therewith reduce the uncertainty about the others. The results from a study by
Schunk and Betsch (2006) suggest that deliberate decisions tend to be less risk-
averse. This seems to support the assumption that an explicit reﬂection about
others’ behavior reduces uncertainty and stabilizes cooperation over time. Of
course, there is no reason to assume that subjects omit concerning about other
group members just because they are not asked to state their beliefs. However,
7 Neugebauer et al. (2009) conclude that conditional cooperation and adaptive belief learning
are the only plausible hypotheses to explain the downward trend in contributions under
feedback conditions.
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several studies point out that the elicitation of beliefs by itself has an eﬀect
on contribution decisions. Dudley (1993) and Croson (2000) report that the
incentivized elicitation of beliefs leads to lower contributions compared to a
condition, in which the subjects are not asked to state their expectations about
others.8 Contrary to that, Wilcox and Feltovich (2000) report no diﬀerences
in a comparable setting. A recent study presented by Gächter and Renner
(2010) provides evidence that also the way of belief elicitation matters for the
average contribution levels. The authors show that contributions are higher
if the belief elicitation is incentivized, while contributions are not aﬀected by
the non-incentivized elicitation compared to a treatment without belief elici-
tation. To the best of our knowledge this is the only work that investigates
the eﬀects of mere belief elicitation without any further incentives.9 Again,
the experimental results point to diﬀerent directions. To gain further insight
into the process of belief forming and its eﬀect on contributions, we investigate
two additional treatments with immediate feedback and varying belief elicita-
tion. On the other hand we use the treatment without feedback and without
repeated elicitation of beliefs. If there is a stabilizing eﬀect from repeatedly
stated beliefs, the contributions should decline in this treatment, unless the
eﬀect from interrupted belief updating is stronger.
As mentioned above, even conditional contributors are supposed to have
selﬁshly biased contribution preferences (Fischbacher et al. 2001) that are re-
vealed in the distance between their own contributions and their belief about
the contributions of the other group members. If this is the case subjects’
beliefs are crucial for two reasons with regard to the model by FG. For one
thing, the initial belief determines the starting point of the belief formation
process (equation: 2.2). On the other hand, the diﬀerence between current
belief and contribution might be used to measure the contribution preference
(equation: 2.3). If subjects’ contribution is a weighted average of her current
belief and the contribution that is predicted from the response function, than
the diﬀerence between the current belief (belief t) and the current contribution
(contributiont) should represent the contribution preference for this point on
the response function. This implies that the distance between belief and con-
8 The elicitation of beliefs is incentivized by paying the subjects additional money depending
on the accuracy of their guesses.
9 Neugebauer et al. (2009) also incentivized the elicitation of beliefs.
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tribution remains stable, if subjects’ contribution preferences do not change
over time. We stress this stability through a higher number of repetitions and
through stronger feedback with an additional summarize of aggregated results
after 10 rounds.
2.3 Experimental design and procedure
A total of 72 students from diﬀerent disciplines participated in the experiment.
Students who had been involved in similar experiments were not allowed to
participate. The participants are randomly invited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004)
and matched into one treatment. The 24 subjects in each treatment are divided
into groups with 4 members and solely act within these groups until the end
of the experiment. Thus we collected 6 independent observations per treat-
ment. The experiment was conducted in the “Laboratorium für experimentelle
Wirtschaftsforschung (eLab)” of the University of Erfurt. The experimental
software was written with z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). The period payoﬀs were
accumulated to a total payoﬀ. The amount of earned tokens was converted
into Euro at an exchange rate of 1 Euro for 70 tokens and paid to the partic-
ipants at the end of the experiment. Written instructions (A.2.1) are handed
out to all subjects and read out by one of the authors. All decisions and payoﬀs
were completely anonymous. Thus, the participants were not able to draw any
conclusions with respect to the individual contribution of their group members
in any treatment.
Treatments
The ﬁrst treatment (B10F10) starts with 10 rounds without any feedback.
Subjects’ are asked to state their beliefs only once, at the beginning of round
1. This part is used to investigate the question, whether the process of belief
updating is interrupted under no information conditions. At the end of round
10 the subjects received a feedback about their own average contributions
(and payoﬀ) and the average contributions from the other group members.
Afterwards the second phase starts with another 10 rounds without feedback.
The restart is not surprising, since it is announced in the instructions that there
will be 3 phases each with 10 rounds. Each phase starts with the elicitation of
beliefs and ends with an aggregated feedback. The only diﬀerence in the second
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treatment (B10F1) is the feedback frequency. In addition to the feedback at the
end of each phase, subjects received the same information (own contribution,
own payoﬀ and average others’ contributions) at the end of each round. The
third treatment (B1F1) increases the frequency of belief elicitation. Subjects
are now asked to state their beliefs about others’ contributions at beginning
of each round. The feedback frequency is the same as in the second treatment
(B10F1). By comparing B1F1 and B10F10, we investigate the eﬀect of the
elicitation of beliefs. The evolution of the selﬁsh bias is observed in the diﬀerent
phases of the B1F1-treatment. Table 2.1 summarizes the diﬀerent feedback
conditions and frequencies of belief elicitation.
Treatment N Belief frequency Feedback frequency
B1F1 24 1 round 1 round
B10F1 24 10 rounds 1 round
B10F10 24 10 rounds 10 rounds
NOINFO* 18 1 round 10 rounds
* The NOINFO treatment was conducted by Neugebauer et al.
(2009) and is used as a benchmark for the B10F10 treatment.
Table 2.1: Summary of experimental design
2.4 Results
First we turn to the eﬀect of missing feedback on the decline in contributions
in phase 1. As can be seen from Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 there is no downward
trend in the absence of feedback (B10F10) whereas the contributions decline in
B10F1 and B1F1. The regression coeﬃcients reveal that there is no time trend
without feedback and the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients between the treatment
without feedback and those with feedback are signiﬁcant (p < 0.01)10. Thus it
can be stated that missing feedback prevents the downward trend in average
contributions.11 With view to the model by FG this result might be interpreted
as support for the importance of feedback for adaptive learning.
10Wald-test for equal-coeﬃcients, The comparison of coeﬃcients is still possible although single
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant (Kennedy 2003)
11The observation of no signiﬁcant decline is in line with Neugebauer et al. (2009) who studied
a treatment comparable to our B10F10 treatment.
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Figure 2.1: Average contributions under immediate and delayed feedback
The result also allows rejecting the hypothesis of learning without feedback
(Weber 2003) in public good games. To be more precisely, it allows reject-
ing the assumption that learning can be observed in players’ actions because
considering the beliefs about others’ behavior - regardless of whether they
are elicited or not - might prevent subjects from playing the rational, selﬁsh
equilibrium solution.
Dv: contribution Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Round in B1F1 -0.380*** 0.286** -0.168***
(0.070) (0.124) (0.081)
Round in B10F1 -0.241* -0.294*** -0.268***
(0.127) (0.079) (0.088)
Round in B10F10 -0.004 -0.106 -0.069
(0.089) (0.079) (0.084)
Const 11.312*** 12.207*** 12.572***
(0.629) (1.499) (1.994)
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clus-
ters in groups) in parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; ***
sign. at 1%. (N = 720)
Table 2.2: Downward trend in contributions in phase 1-3
The average contributions in B10F10 (12.12) are signiﬁcantly (p < 0.05)12
12All comparisons between two treatments are tested as independent samples with the MWU-
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above those in B10F1 (9.73). The variance in contributions within the groups,
which might be expected to be smaller without feedback, does not diﬀer be-
tween the treatments (B10F10: 29.67; B10F1: 36.19; p = 0.394).
Next we analyze the evolution of contributions in the later phases of the
B10F10 treatment. As predicted by the model of adaptive learning (FG) the
subjects reduce their average contributions (from 12.12 to 10.77) after the ﬁrst
feedback at the end of round 10. The diﬀerence in contributions between the
ﬁrst and the second phase is weakly signiﬁcant (p < 0.1). In the last phase
(after the second feedback) subjects contribute 8.51 tokens on average. This
is again signiﬁcantly below the contributions in the phase before (p < 0.05).
As in phase one there is no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of time on the contributions
(see Table 2.2) in the second and the third phase.
Figure 2.1 also reveals that the decline in average contributions from phase
one to three does not depend on the feedback frequency. Although the subjects
in B10F10 received only delayed feedback, the distance (3.61) between the av-
erage contributions in phase one and those in phase three, is not signiﬁcantly
smaller (p = 0.818) than under immediate feedback conditions (B10F1: 4.01).
Thus it can be stated that subjects adapt their behavior to the received feed-
back whereas they do not reduce their contributions if they have no current
information about the others. In other words, adaptive learning is interrupted
as long as there is no feedback but it takes place whenever it is possible and
the extent of adaption is not altered by the feedback frequency.
With view to our second research question (the eﬀect of elicitation of be-
liefs) we ﬁrst compare the average contributions between the two treatments
with immediate feedback but diﬀerent belief elicitation frequencies. As can be
seen from Figure 2.2, the average contributions are almost identical in B10F1
(7.83) and B1F1 (7.29). The corresponding Mann-Whitney-U-test conﬁrms
that there is no signiﬁcant divergence over all three phases (p = 0.937). The
same applies to the single phases.13 With regard to the variance in contribu-
tions (within the groups), the assumption that the elicitation of beliefs con-
tributes to a stabilization of cooperation cannot be conﬁrmed. This applies
to the overall variance within the groups (38.7 in B10F1 and 30.1 in B1F1)
test (exact, two tailed) and 6 independent observations in each treatment.
13p = 0.699; p = 0.818 ; p = 1 (phase 1-3)
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as well as to each phase.14 These ﬁndings are in line with those presented by
Gächter and Renner (2010) and provide further support for the assumption
that the mere elicitation of beliefs does not alter the subjects’ behavior, for
they consider the other group members’ behavior either way.
0
5
10
15
20
1 11 21 30
Av
er
ag
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
Round
B10F1
B1F1
Figure 2.2: Average contributions over time in B10F1 and B1F1
Our last research question which concerns subjects’ selﬁshly biased con-
tribution preferences is investigated by comparing the diﬀerent phases of the
B1F1 treatment. Table 2.3 sheds a ﬁrst light on subjects’ initial diﬀerence
between contribution and belief. As can be seen there, the majority of sub-
jects (69.2%) do not have the intention to contribute below their beliefs at
the beginning of the ﬁrst round. Thus, most subjects are not per se selﬁshly
biased conditional contributors. Further support comes from the evolution of
the diﬀerence between average contributions and beliefs in B1F1 (Figure 2.3).
Obviously there is almost no diﬀerence (-0.45) between beliefs and contribu-
tions in the ﬁrst phase although subjects received a feedback after each round.
The diﬀerence is twice as high (-0.97) in phase two but the beliefs are still
not signiﬁcantly above the contributions (p = 0.219)15. Only in the last phase
there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (-1.50) and subjects can be described as selﬁshly
biased conditional contributors (p < 0.05).
With regard the model by FG these ﬁndings are surprising because subjects
14p = 0.818; p = 0.598 ; p = 0.589 (phase 1-3); p = 0.699 (overall)
15Wilcoxon-test for related samples, exact, two-tailed, N=6
2.4 Results 37
B1F1 B10F1 B10F10 CT Overall %
(N=24) (N=24) (N=24) (N=48) (N=120)
Contribution ≥ Belief 16 17 17 33 69.20%
Contribution < Belief 8 7 7 15 30.08%
The CT treatment is a standard public good game (2 x 20 rounds) used as
a control treatment in another experiment which is reported in chapter 4.
Table 2.3: Diﬀerences between initial beliefs and initial contributions
should reveal their selﬁshly biased preferences already at the beginning of the
game and the number of subjects who contribute less than they expect from
their teammates should be larger.
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Figure 2.3: Average contributions and beliefs in B1F1
According to the model by FG there are two possible explanations for the
growing diﬀerences between beliefs and contributions. First, the inﬂuence of
feedback on the process of belief updating might change. As a consequence
the inﬂuence of subjects’ beliefs on their actual contribution decision might
also change over time if subjects’ initial contribution preferences become less
important in later repetitions. The second possible explanation is that subjects
might not only use the (negative) feedback to update their beliefs about others’
future actions but also to compensate the relative ’losses’ they received in the
previous rounds. In other words the observed diﬀerence between average beliefs
and contributions might be explained by reciprocal behavior rather than by
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intentional selﬁshness.
The panel regression presented in Table 2.4 provides support for the ﬁrst
assumption. As in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) the model describes sub-
jects’ beliefs as a function of the beliefs in the previous round (Belieft−1) and
the feedback in the diﬀerent phases.16 It can be seen there that the inﬂuence
of feedback is considerably larger in the second phase than in the ﬁrst one.17
The same applies on the third phase although the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients
is smaller (p < 0.05). It seems that subjects belief updating changes over time.
Dv: belief B1F1
Round -0.067** (0.021)
Belief t−1 0.405*** (0.082)
Feedback in phase 1 0.266*** (0.044)
Feedback in phase 2 0.357*** (0.030)
Feedback in phase 3 0.408*** (0.043)
Const 3.427*** (0.657)
R2 0.40 .
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects,
robust errors (6 clusters in groups) in parenthe-
ses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign.
at 1%. (N=648)
Table 2.4: Feedback eﬀects on beliefs in B1F1
(phase 1 - 3)
If we follow the model suggested by FG, the updated belief enters subjects’
contribution decision on top of their initial contribution preferences. In order
to explore the eﬀect of initial preferences on later contribution decisions we
classify the subjects according to the diﬀerence between their beliefs and con-
tributions at the beginning of round 1. These preferences are independent from
feedback information about other group members and can be interpreted as
the unconditional intention to contribute at a certain belief level. As reported
in Table 2.3 less than 30% of the subjects (B > C; N=7) can be classiﬁed as
selﬁsh players who contribute below their belief whereas the remaining subjects
(B ≤ C; N=17) perfectly match their beliefs or even contribute above their
16To dispel worries about multi-collinearity we considered the variance inﬂation factors and
ﬁnd them below the critical value of 5: average vif = 2.17.
17Wald-test: coeﬃcients for Feedback in phase 1 and Feedback in phase 2; p < 0.001
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expectations about the others. Figure 2.4 compares the average contributions
and beliefs of the both player types over all rounds.
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Figure 2.4: Average beliefs and contributions by type
This comparison yields two interesting results. First, the average contri-
butions provided by selﬁsh players (Type B > C: 5.08 tokens) are lower
than those by subjects who can be classiﬁed as conditional contributors (Type
B ≤ C: 8.21).18 Second, the distance between average contributions and be-
liefs is considerably larger (2.55) and grows over time if subjects are selﬁsh
whereas conditional contributors match their beliefs closer (0.32) in all three
phases.19 These results show that neither the selﬁsh players nor the conditional
cooperators resign from their initial contribution preferences. Nevertheless, the
average contributions from conditional players decline over time and converge
towards the selﬁsh players’ contributions. This seems to conﬁrm the growing
inﬂuence of feedback on the process of belief forming that is reported in Table
2.4 because the conditional players adjust their beliefs (and their contributions)
to the feedback that is lowered by selﬁsh players.
Another result from the comparison of selﬁsh and conditional players can
be seen in Figure 2.5 that only shows the last phase. While there is an obvi-
ous diﬀerence in contributions (p < 0.1) both types share very similar beliefs.
(p = 1). Thus, the selﬁsh players do not only foster the downward trend
18The diﬀerence in average contributions (phase 1-3) between both types of players is sig-
niﬁcant at the 10% level (Wilcoxon-test, exact, two-tailed). We use the Wilcoxon-test for
paired samples because the classiﬁed subjects participated in diﬀerent groups and cannot
be treated as independent observations.
19The average distance between beliefs and contributions is also signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
The distance in phase 3 is signiﬁcantly larger (p < 0.1) than in phase 1 for selﬁsh players.
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Figure 2.5: Diﬀerences in contributions and beliefs in phase 3
in contributions but are also the main explanation for the diﬀerence between
average beliefs and contributions. As a consequence the diﬀerences between
both types of players should be supposed in a diﬀerent processing of beliefs
and preferences rather than in a diﬀerent processing of the received feedback.
In other words, both types of players draw similar conclusions from the in-
formation they receive about their teammates but they respond with diﬀerent
contributions. This result receives further support from the regression that
is reported in Table 5. To describe the process of belief forming we use the
model that was applied in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) but include sepa-
rate independent variables with regard to the player types (indicated by S for
selﬁsh players and C for conditional contributors). It shows that the inﬂuence
of feedback on actual belief does not diﬀer between selﬁsh and conditional
subjects (FeedbackS and FeedbackC). Since the same applies to the inﬂuence
of subjects’ previous beliefs (BeliefSt−1 and BeliefCt−1) it can be stated that
both types of players update their beliefs in a similar way.20
The crucial diﬀerence between selﬁsh and conditional subjects is the way in
which both types of players process their beliefs in their contribution decisions.
The inﬂuence of actual beliefs is considerably smaller (p < 0.1) for those
subjects who are classiﬁed as selﬁsh players (BeliefS) than for those who are
classiﬁed as conditional cooperators (BeliefC). In contrast to that there is no
diﬀerence in the inﬂuence of subjects’ previous contributions (p = 0.427). In
20Wald-test: coeﬃcients for FeedbackS and FeedbackC ; p = 0.949; coeﬃcients for BeliefSt−1
and BeliefCt−1 i; p = 0.358
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Dv: belief Dv: contribution
Round -0.187*** (0.015) -0.069*** (0.018)
BeliefSt−1 0.371*** (0.081)
BeliefCt−1 0.436*** (0.102)
FeedbackS 0.354*** (0.076)
FeedbackC 0.347*** (0.055)
BeliefS 0.253*** (0.129)
BeliefC 0.644*** (0.124)
ContributionSt−1 0.295*** (0.098)
ContributionCt−1 0.173*** (0.108)
Const 2.460*** (0.544) 2.429*** (0.847)
R2 0.41 0.42
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6
clusters in groups) in parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at
5%; *** sign. at 1%. (N=696)
Table 2.5: Belief forming and contribution decision
summary, it can be stated that the impression of general selﬁshness among
subjects conveyed by the average contributions and beliefs (see Figure 2.4) is
not conﬁrmed by our data if we consider the initial preferences. Instead it
shows that the downward trend is triggered by a minority of selﬁsh subjects.
2.5 Conclusion
We present the results of an experiment conducted to test the diﬀerent elements
of the process that was brought forward to explain the decline in contrxibu-
tions in repeated social dilemma situations. Based on a standard public good
game our design allows us to investigate the eﬀects of feedback, elicitation of
beliefs and contribution preferences. Our results show that missing feedback
prevents the downward trend in contributions by interrupting the process of
belief updating. Delayed feedback does not sustainably change this process.
Subjects adjust (decline) their contributions over 30 rounds to a similar ex-
tend regardless of whether they received feedback after each round or after 10
rounds. This result emphasizes the importance of feedback learning in social
interactions.
The non-incentivized elicitation of beliefs has no eﬀect on average contribu-
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tions because there is no stabilizing eﬀect in terms of contributions or variances.
From a methodological point of view, this result shows that the elicitation itself
does not foster the behavior that is measures afterwards.
With view to contribution preferences we found that the majority of subjects
do not show selﬁshly biased behavior at the beginning of the game. There-
fore, selﬁshly biased contribution preferences as reported by Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010) are not suﬃcient to explain the downward trend. According
to our data the reason for diminishing cooperation is not the majority of sub-
jects who contribute a little less than they expect from others but a smaller
group (30%) of players with a distinctive preference to contribute below their
beliefs. These selﬁsh players cannot be observed by investigating the average
contributions (and beliefs) because their beliefs do not diﬀer from those of
conditional contributors. Nevertheless, their contribution behavior seems to
trigger the downward trend by creating negative feedback for the conditional
contributors. Further support for this assumption comes from experiments
that regrouped the participants with regard to their contribution preferences.
The results show that contributions are stable if a group is only composed
of conditional contributors (Page, Putterman, and Unel 2005; Burlando and
Guala 2005; Gächter and Thöni 2005). However, even a group of perfect con-
ditional contributors might reduce cooperation over time if they start with
diﬀerent beliefs about each other. Composing groups of (perfect) conditional
contributors with diﬀerent beliefs might answer the question whether cooper-
ation can be stable if subjects start with diﬀerent expectations.
There is another methodological issue that should be investigated in further
experiments. Comparing the initial diﬀerences between beliefs and contribu-
tions in the B1F1 treatment with those reported by Fischbacher and Gächter
(2010) reveals that there is a considerable distance already in the ﬁrst round.
Since both experiments used a standard linear public good with identical pa-
rameterization the only diﬀerence is the elicitation of contribution preferences
via strategy method at the beginning of the game. Thus, it should be inves-
tigated whether this way of elicitation fosters selﬁshly biased behavior. The
results also imply that investigating average behavior and beliefs is not suﬃ-
cient to understand the dynamics of diminishing cooperation in repeated social
dilemma situations.
Chapter 3
Feedback and leading by
example
A leader is a dealer in hope. (Napoleon Bonaparte)
3.1 Introduction - Leading by example
Leadership is one of the most fundamental elements of organizations, not only
in the ﬁeld of enterprises but also with view to political and cultural institu-
tions. According to a classical theory of the ﬁrm presented by Alchian and
Demsetz (1972), leadership is a vital element in every team production. The
necessity of leadership is justiﬁed with regard to the teammates’ incentives to
reduce their eﬀorts and free-ride on the performance of other teammates. An
eﬀective means to overcome this ineﬃcient situation is the appointment of a
leader who has the right to sanction shirking. In this case the main source of
the leaders’ inﬂuence is authority. However, besides these formal elements of
organizational structure like hierarchies, authority and obligatory rules, orga-
nizations can draw on personal leadership as a means to adjust their members’
behavior towards the aims of the organization. It is widely accepted that lead-
ership is more than the (re)allocation of resources and the disciplining of shirk-
ers (Schein 2004; Bass and Riggio 2006; Kearney and Gebert 2009). Leadership
also transforms the teammates’ attitude through trust, loyalty and individual
acknowledgement. Another element of transformational leadership is leading
by example, which is described as an implicit way to change followers’ behav-
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ior through the imitation of the leaders’ actions (Yukl 2009). Beyond that it
is not only considered as an alternative style of personal leadership but also
as a catalyst for the formal elements of organizational structure (Mastrangelo,
Eddy, and Lorenzet 2004). The remainder of this chapter is organized as fol-
lows. In the next section (3.2) the related economic literature is reviewed and
previous result are summarized. Section 3.3 describes the treatments in de-
tail. Afterwards, section 3.4 discusses the predictions derived from the basic
public good game and the implemented leadership mechanisms. The results
are presented and discussed in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 concludes and
discusses possible implications.
The positive inﬂuence of leadership on the behavior of followers has also
received growing attention in economic literature. Hermalin (1998) presents a
theory of leading by example in the context of team production and shows that
a leader can induce cooperative behavior by taking the ﬁrst move. Vesterlund
(2003) draws similar conclusions from modeling fundraising behavior. She
demonstrates that announcing the ﬁrst contributions can help to foster later
contributions if the information costs are low enough. Another important
feature of leading by example is put forward by Foss (2001). He argues that
the example given by the leader does not only inﬂuence the followers’ actual
cooperative behavior but also their beliefs about the other followers. That
suggests that there is an additional source of inﬂuence from leaders to followers
beyond imitation and reciprocity.
We investigate the inﬂuence of personal leadership within an experimental
setting in which the leader has private information about the followers’ behav-
ior. Thus, we are able to provide quantitative support for the assumption that
the leader is able to change followers’ attitudes and beliefs towards the other
followers and in a wider sense also towards the organization. Furthermore, our
results show that the leaders’ inﬂuence also changes the followers’ behavior
and in consequence improves the team performance.
3.2 Related literature
Several experimental studies conﬁrm the predicted rise in cooperation in the
presence of a personal leader who acts as primus inter pares. In each of follow-
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ing experiments leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game1,
i.e. the leader states her contribution in a ﬁrst move while all followers decide
simultaneously after they know about the leaders’ choice. An early experi-
ment conducted by Gächter and Renner (2004) reveals a positive correlation
between leader and follower contributions but only a small positive eﬀect2 from
leading by example. A stronger eﬀect is reported by Güth, Levati, Sutter, and
Van Der Heijden (2007) in a similar setting. Besides that, this study also re-
ports a higher inﬂuence from those leaders that are equipped with additional
authority.3 In contrast to this heterogeneity within the followers’ endowments
showed to be opposed to leaders’ impact and reduce cooperation to the level of
a simultaneous public-good. The same applies to missing information about
the distribution of these endowments within the group (Levati, Sutter, and
Van Der Heijden 2007).
The question whether the positive eﬀect is actually induced by the leader
and not by the mere existence of an additional reference point that can be used
by the followers to adapt their behavior, is addressed by Houser, Levy, Padgitt,
Peart, and Xiao (2007). The results presented there show that the signal itself
does not increase contributions if it is not sent by a human leader. The insight
that there is a need for a personal leader necessarily raises the question how
this leader can be selected. Due to the nature of leading by example or at
least due to its implementation in laboratory experiments the leader has to be
a member of the group. At this point it does not seem to matter whether one
player continuously takes the lead or the position is rotating among the group
members (see Güth et al. 2007). In contrast to that endogenous self-selection
results in considerably higher eﬃciency compared to an exogenous random
selection (Arbak 2007; Rivas and Sutter 2009).
Another strand of literature tries to disentangle the diﬀerent motives group
1 Moxnes and Heijden (2003) investigated leading by example in a public bad setting and also
ﬁnd a positive eﬀect from leadership.
2 Gächter and Renner (2004)report a signiﬁcance diﬀerence between the leader and his follow-
ers as well as between the leader and the subjects in the control treatment (without leader).
However, they report no (signiﬁcant) diﬀerence between the followers and the control sub-
jects.
3 Güth et al. (2007) conducted a treatment, in which the leaders have the power to exclude
one follower from the group. This result is also conﬁrmed by Rivas and Sutter (2009), who
investigated the impact from rewards and punishment in a leading by example setting. They
report, that punishment through exclusion yields higher contributions than rewarding the
followers.
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members might have to follow the leader. Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund
(2007) investigated a two-person-game, in which the leader has private infor-
mation about the actual value of the public good. They conclude that the
leaders inﬂuence is rather driven by signaling than by reciprocity. In contrast
to that, Meidinger and Villeval (2002) favor reciprocity as the mainspring of
followers’ behavior in a similar (two-person) setting. Although the results are
not consistent, they point at the crucial role of private information. Unfortu-
nately, the two-person setting also eliminates the others follower’s behavior as
a source of information and therewith blocks the view on the more realistic
situation in which one person leads a group of followers.
After all, there is some evidence for the positive eﬀect from leading by
example. The high positive correlation between leaders’ and followers’ con-
tributions is obvious in all studies (although the contribution diﬀerences are
rather small). However, the question whether this correlation is the result of
signaling, reciprocity or mere imitation received no concluding answer. This
study investigates another obvious reason that is not only crucial for the con-
nection between leaders’ and followers’ contributions but also for the success
of leading by example. In each of the studies (with more than one follower)
mentioned above leaders and followers rely on the same source of information
to decide about their contributions, namely the feedback information about
the average contributions in the previous round. According to what is known
about the processing of this information (see Fischbacher and Gächter 2010),
it seems plausible to assume that they also derive similar conclusions from it
and as a consequence they should show similar behavior. Even if we allow for
heterogeneous contribution preferences, there is no reason to expect any diﬀer-
ences since the distribution of conditional contributors and free-riders should
not diﬀer between leaders and followers. Especially not if the leader is selected
by chance as it is done in most of the aforementioned studies.
This study tries to contribute an additional explanation to the nature of
leading by example with an experimental setting that treats followers’ con-
tributions as private information, which is only available to the leader. In
comparison to the usual setting explained above, this simple change seems
suitable to provide insight into the relationship between leaders and followers.
The results show that a leader, who has private information about her follow-
3.3 Experimental design and procedure 47
ers’ contributions, is not only able to lift up the level of cooperation but also
to stop the downward shift in contributions.
3.3 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was conducted in the eLab4 at the University of Erfurt, using
the software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). A total of 48 students from diﬀerent
disciplines were randomly invited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and participated
in the experiment. Written instructions (see Appendix A.3.1), handed out
to all subjects and read out by the author, provide information on the payoﬀ
function, individual endowments and group size. All decisions and payoﬀs were
completely anonymous. Thus, subjects were not able to draw any conclusions
with respect to the individual contribution of their group members in any
treatment.
To shed some light on the questions, whether additional information alters
group members’ contribution behavior or not, two diﬀerent treatments were
conducted based on a standard public-good game. The game is repeated for 20
rounds in the ﬁrst phase. Another 20 rounds are played in a second phase. At
the beginning of the experiment the participants are assigned to groups of four
members each. The group composition remains unchanged (partner design)
until the end of the experiment. Each subject receives an endowment of 20
tokens (ei) in each round and has to decide how much he or she contributes
(ci) to the public project and how much to keep for the private account. Each
token invested in the group project is deducted from the contributor’s private
account and generates a surplus for the entire group (as it is multiplied by 1.6).
The group account (Cj) is evenly distributed among all four group members
(N).
As soon as all contribution decisions are made the individual payoﬀs for the
recent period are calculated using the following payoﬀ-function (3.1):
Πi = ei − ci + Cj, with Cj = 0.4
4∑
i=1
ci (3.1)
4 “Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung”
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To establish a leader-follower-relation the contribution decisions are not
made simultaneously. After all members of the group stated their beliefs about
the next contribution provided by the leader and by the other group members,
the leader decides ﬁrst about her contribution to give an example to her fol-
lowers. The followers are informed about their leaders’ decision and thereafter
provide their own contributions simultaneously. After that the leader is in-
formed about her followers’ average contributions. The only diﬀerence is the
additional information given to the follower. While the followers in the full in-
formation treatment (hereafter FI) receive the same feedback (about the other
followers’ contributions) as the leader, the followers in the private information
treatment (hereafter PI) do not come to know how many token the remaining
followers provided for the public good.
Both treatments start with the selection of a leader from the group members.
Without regard to further concerns about procedural fairness and legitimation
the only aim of the selection procedure presented here is to avoid a random
choice and to implement a leader with some kind of qualiﬁcation for the actual
game. For that reason the ﬁrst task for each subject is to estimate the average
contribution provided by the other group members. After that each subject
is asked to state how many tokens he or she wants to contribute to the group
project. These announcements are used to calculate the actual average contri-
bution within the group and to compare it with the estimations stated before.
According to this comparison the group member with the smallest estimation
error becomes the leader of the group. If there is more than one subject with
the smallest estimation error, the leader is randomly selected from these sub-
jects. The results of the estimations are not made public until the end of the
experiment.
Once selected, the leader keeps her position until the end of phase one.
In the second phase the leader becomes a common member of the group and
decides simultaneously with the former followers about her contribution. Table
3.1 summarizes the procedure in phase one and two.
Each subject, regardless of its later role, is informed about the leader selec-
tion procedure and all other steps described in Table 3.1 (except the treatment
diﬀerence). Beyond that subjects are told that there will be a second phase.
This is done without providing information about the particular task. After
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Phase Step Leader Follower
1
-l
ea
di
ng
by
ex
am
pl
e 1 Leader selection procedure (1st round only)
2 Belief → leader
3 Belief → follower Belief → follower
4 Contribution decision
5 Feedback ← leader
6 Contribution decision
7 Feedback ← follower FI Feedback ← follower
PI: No feedback
2
-n
o
le
ad
er 1 Belief → follower
2 Contribution decision
3 FI: Feedback ← follower
PI: Feedback ← follower
Table 3.1: Procedure in phase 1 and 2
the ﬁrst phase subjects are instructed to play another 20 rounds of a simultane-
ous public goods game with regular feedback about the other group members’
average contributions in both treatments.
3.4 Predictions
Assuming perfect rational and payoﬀ maximizing individuals, everybody, re-
gardless of whether he or she is a leader or a follower, should play the dominant
strategy and contribute nothing to the public good. However, it is a well known
result from numerous experiments that subjects deviate from that strategy and
provide positive contributions to the team project (for an overview see Ledyard
1995; Chaudhuri 2011). One prominent explanation has been put forward by
Fischbacher et al. (2001). They show that a considerable number of individ-
uals behave as conditional contributors, i.e. they are willing to contribute if
others contribute, too. Under perfect information conditions this behavior can
explain the decline of cooperation rates in repeated public goods experiments.
Subjects adapt their own contributions towards the contribution average in
their group, which is continuously lowered by a number of free riders. In con-
sequence the overall contributions to the public good diminish over time. In
50 3. Feedback and leading by example
a recent study Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) provide empirical evidence for
the assumption, that not even conditional cooperators match the contribu-
tion of their teammates perfectly. Instead subjects’ behavior is described as
selﬁshly biased, i.e. the group members tend to contribute below the group
average and therewith accelerate the downward trend in cooperation.
A similar phenomenon is regularly observed in leading by example settings.
Followers contribute (signiﬁcantly) less than their leader as long as she has
no (additional) means to sanction her followers. Nevertheless, contributions
of both types show a high positive correlation (see for example Gächter and
Renner 2004; Güth et al. 2007). At the same time the imperfect response to
the other followers’ contributions might enlarge the diﬀerence between leader
and follower, if (some) group members want to contribute not only less than
the leader but also below the average of the other followers. As a consequence
the followers’ contributions under full information conditions (FI) should be
lower than the contributions in the PI-treatment, since followers do not know
the average contributions of others.
There are several other reasons that point to higher average contributions
in the private information treatment. The additional information, created by
the feedback about other followers’ contributions, also acts as an alternative
anchoring point (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Mussweiler 2000) and allows
subjects to choose whether they take the leaders’ or the followers’ behavior
as a reference. Considering the selﬁsh bias mentioned above, this might re-
sult in inconsistent signals, towards which the followers have to adapt their
behavior. If there are two sources of feedback, it might happen that a follower
contributes more than the other followers but less than the leader or vice versa.
This situation can be supposed to induce further uncertainty to the followers’
environment and there is some evidence that uncertainty reduces contributions
in repeated interactions. For example Au, Chen, and Komorita (1998) report
that cooperation is lower if there is uncertainty about the outcome of the pub-
lic good.5 On the other hand, this uncertainty is also present if there is no
additional reference point. Relying on a single source of information might
create additional distrust towards the leaders’ motives among the followers.
5 Other results, which conﬁrm the negative eﬀect of uncertainty on contributions can be found
in Wit and Wilke (1998) or Brennan et al. (2008).
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There is no clear prediction from theoretical works or former experiments that
disentangles both kinds of uncertainty. Furthermore, the PI condition might
also inﬂuence leaders’ behavior. If the leader recognizes the importance of her
inputs for the group performance, she might improve her example. In other
words, being the exclusive source of feedback might strengthen the leaders’
commitment to her role modeling function (see Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner,
Wernsing, and Peterson 2008).
According to Foss (2001), leadership might also inﬂuence the group mem-
bers’ beliefs. The author argues that a leader is able to solve coordination
problems because she creates a belief structure that substitutes common knowl-
edge.6 Following this argumentation, it seems plausible to assume that the
followers in the PI-treatment are able to learn about other followers’ behavior
by drawing conclusions from the leaders’ behavior. At this point the question
arises whether the leader inﬂuences these conclusions or not. If the leader has
private information on which the followers have to rely it should be easier for
her to convince the followers of a cooperative culture. However, this gives rise
to the temptation to misguide the followers. A selﬁsh leader can use the asym-
metry in information to free ride on the contributions of her followers if the
teammates’ cooperation is independent from the leaders’ example. This case
will occur if the followers’ beliefs about their teammates have a stronger inﬂu-
ence on their behavior than the example given by the leader. In contrast to
that, the altruistic or eﬃciency oriented leader can use her information advan-
tage to the beneﬁt of the entire group. If she continues to give a good example
by contributing high amounts of her endowment even if not all followers re-
ciprocate, she might ﬁnally convince the group of a high cooperation level,
which will in turn raise the contributions of conditional cooperative followers.
Howsoever, the questions of leader motives are not primarily addressed in our
experiment, since it was designed with the focus on followers’ behavior.
The diﬀerent information conditions should also alter behavior in the simul-
taneous game (phase 2); in a way that subjects in PI contribute more than
the ones in the FI-treatment. With this second phase we should be able to
shed some light on the sustainability of the transformation process in follow-
ers’ belief structure. If average contributions are indeed higher under private
6 Foss (2001): page 2f
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information conditions, PI-subjects will have experienced 20 rounds of stable
cooperation. Although they are now able to update their beliefs with regard
to the received feedback, they might coordinate on higher contributions. In
contrast to that the cooperation rates in the FI-treatment should decline for
several reasons. First of all these participants should have experienced lower
contributions in phase one and beyond that they are still able to adapt their
behavior with reference to the feedback they receive in phase two. Considering
that the positive inﬂuence from leading by example does not foster contribu-
tions anymore, the average inputs should be even lower than in the ﬁrst 20
rounds.
If leaders are aware of their importance for the group and to some extend
even disposed to get exploited by the followers, as described by Güth et al.
(2007), their behavior should even diﬀer from those of the followers in the
second phase. Since former leaders still can give a good example to some
extent, they might stick to their previous behavior and contribute more than
the other group members.
3.5 Experimental results
The results are presented in two subjections according to the two phases of the
experiment. The ﬁrst one focuses on the contributions and beliefs in the lead-
ing by example setting (phase 1) and analyses the behavior and interrelation of
leaders and followers under diﬀerent feedback conditions. In the second subjec-
tion the simultaneous part of the experiment (phase 2) is discussed with view
of the change in contribution behavior within the treatments and remaining
diﬀerences between the two feedback settings.
The results from the leader selection procedure show no diﬀerences between
the treatments. The average estimations are 9.6 in the FI treatment and 9.0
in PI and the same applies for the average contributions, which are 10.42 in
FI and 10.08 under private information conditions. None of the diﬀerences is
signiﬁcant, neither within the treatments nor between the feedback conditions.7
Therefore we are convinced that the subjects are randomly distributed to the
7 The diﬀerence between the average estimations and the actual average contributions is 0.82
(p = 0.355) in FI and 1.08 (p = 0.678) in PI. The average estimation error does not diﬀer
between the treatments (p = 0.980).
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treatments with regard to their contribution preferences.
Overall 1st half 2nd half Diﬀerence*
(round 1-20) (round 1-10) (round 11-20) 1st vs. 2nd
FI 6.73 (33%) 8.29 (41%) 5.16 (26%) -3.13 (0.094)
PI 10.84 (54%) 9.58 (47%) 12.11 (61%) 2.53 (0.313)
Diﬀ.** 4.11 (0.180) 1.29 (0.818) 6.95 (0.041)
Notes: Average contributions (% of endowment) and diﬀerences (p-value) in phase 1;
*tested with Wilcoxon-test, two-tailed (exact); **tested with Mann-Whitney-U-test, two-
tailed (exact)
Table 3.2: Average contributions in phase 1
As can be seen from Table 3.2, the average contribution in phase one is
10.84 in the PI-treatment and therewith 4.11 tokens above the one in the FI-
treatment (6.73). This might give a ﬁrst cue to the positive inﬂuence of private
information.
However, the distance between the treatments changes over time. While
there is only a small diﬀerence in contributions in the ﬁrst 10 rounds (1.29),
the distance is more than ﬁve times higher (6.95) in the second half of phase
one (see also Figure 3.1).
Obviously contribution diﬀerences are driven by the dynamics of the feed-
back conditions and not by diﬀerent expectations at the beginning of the exper-
iment. This becomes clear if the initial beliefs, stated after the leader selection
procedure, are taken into account. One might expect that leaders anticipate
their limited inﬂuence in the FI-treatment and therefore reduce their initial
expectations towards the followers’ contribution.
The same might hold true for the followers and their belief about the leaders’
input to the public good. If there is a diﬀerent appraisal of the information
conditions announced in the instructions, there also might be a diﬀerence in
initial beliefs. Actually this is not the case8 and therefore it seems plausible
to assume that the contribution diﬀerences observed in phase one are a result
of adaption towards the feedback which subjects received during the game.
8 There are no diﬀerences (between the treatments) in the initial beliefs of followers towards
other followers (p = 0.589), the initial beliefs towards the leader (p = 0.589) and not in the
leaders belief towards followers’ contributions (p = 0.699), according to the Mann-Whitney-
U-test (exact, two-tailed).
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Figure 3.1: Average contributions in phase 1
At this point the prediction of higher contributions under private informa-
tion conditions can only be partly conﬁrmed. Thus, the next step is to explain
the diﬀerent evolutions of contributions.
One ﬁrst explanation for the diﬀerence in contributions might be found in
the distance between leaders and followers. If followers do not have feedback
information about their teammates, they will exclusively rely on the leaders’
contribution. As a consequence the diﬀerence between leaders’ and followers’
contributions should be smaller in the PI-treatment. The results tent to that
assumption since the distance is smaller if the leader has private information9.
Furthermore the comparison between the ﬁrst and the second half of phase one
shows an increase in the diﬀerence between leaders’ and follower’s contributions
in the FI-treatment, while the diﬀerence decreases in PI (see also Figure 3.2).
In the PI-treatment the average distance in the ﬁrst phase is only 0.83 token
while the average diﬀerence between leader and follower contributions is almost
twice as high in the FI-treatment (1.56).
Further support for the diﬀerence in leaders’ inﬂuence on followers’ contri-
butions comes from the panel regression presented in Table 3.3. Contributions
are described as a function of time (round), leaders’ contribution and the be-
lief about the other followers’ contribution.10 Model C1 captures the ﬁrst 10
9 see Appendix A.3.2
10 In order to check for possible multi-collinearity we take the variance inﬂation actors into
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Figure 3.2: Average leader and follower contributions in phase 1
rounds and shows no considerable diﬀerence in leaders’ inﬂuence between the
treatments. However, the model C2 which captures the rounds 11 to 20 shows
that followers contributions are signiﬁcantly more aﬀected by leaders’ actions
under private information (PI).11
Dv: followers’ contribution C1 (round 1-10) C2 (round 11-20)
Round -0.194** (0.093) -0.004 (0.041)
Leaders’ contribution PI 0.435*** (0.087) 0.624*** (0.084)
Leaders’ contribution FI 0.313*** (0.036) 0.402*** (0.092)
Belief (Followers) 0.265*** (0.086) 0.314*** (0.107)
Cons 3.545*** (0.931) 0.445 (0.911)
R2 0.34 0.66
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clusters in groups)
in parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%. Wald-test: equal
coeﬃcients for Leaders’ contribution in C2. F = 2.82 p < 0.1. (N = 360)
Table 3.3: Leaders’ inﬂuence on followers’ contributions
The higher inﬂuence of leaders’ contribution also provides ﬁrst support for
the assumption that followers’ attitudes and beliefs change over time. There-
fore the next step is to analyze the process of belief forming. As stated above,
account. They are below the critical value (5) in both models: 1.42 for the C1 model and
1.64 for the C2 model.
11Wald-test: coeﬃcients for leaders’ contribution PI and leaders’ contribution FI p < 0.1
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theories of transformational leadership predict that the personal leader does
not only inﬂuence teammates’ behavior but also their belief structure. Our
model of belief updating is similar to the one that is used by Fischbacher
and Gächter (2010). The belief about the other followers’ next contribution
is described as a function of the belief about the leaders’ next action and
the feedback information from the previous round.12 Due to the design, this
feedback consists of two values: the average contributions of the remaining
followers and the leaders’ contribution in the previous round. This distinction
is important because it provides insight to what extend the teammates in the
PI treatment draw conclusions from changes in leaders’ behavior. The results
of the panel regression are presented in Table 3.4.
Analyzing the process of belief forming reveals to things. First, followers
in the FI-treatment use both sources of feedback to update their expectations
about other followers’ behavior. Although the belief about the followers is
widely determined by the belief about the leader, the feedback from the pre-
vious round is also taken into account. It seems that followers expect their
teammates to deviate from leaders’ next choice. Otherwise there should be no
additional eﬀect of feedback on the beliefs about followers’ contributions.
Dv: belief → follower Full info (FI) Private info (PI)
Round -0.011 (0.019) 0.066 (0.042)
Belief → leader 0.699*** (0.056) 0.870*** (0.042)
Leaders’ contribution FI 0.313*** (0.036) 0.402*** (0.092)
Change in leaders’ contr. 0.067 (0.044) 0.122*** (0.032)
Feedback ← followers 0.138*** (0.049)
Cons 0.841** (0.410) 0.043 (0.664)
R2 0.74 0.85
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clusters in groups)
in parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%. (N = 342)
Table 3.4: Belief forming under full and private information
The results for the PI treatment show that followers seem to compensate
the missing feedback by taking the change in leaders’ behavior into account.
The results support the assumption that leadership inﬂuences the followers’
12The variance inﬂation factors are again below the critical value in both models: 1.22 for the
FI model and 1.52 for the PI model.
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belief structure.
The transformation in the belief structure becomes obvious, if we look at
the distances between the beliefs about followers, the beliefs about the leader
and the actual contribution decision. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, there
is an almost constant distance between followers’ expectations of the other
teammates and the leader in the FI treatment.
At the same time followers’ actual contributions are below their belief about
the remaining teammates in every round. Figure 3.3 shows the same variables
for the PI treatment and the ﬁrst rounds are comparable to the ones in FI. How-
ever, the diﬀerences decline over time and the belief about followers’ behavior
as well as the actual contribution converge to the belief about the leaders’ next
choice.
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Figure 3.3: Beliefs and contributions in FI and Pi treatment
The average diﬀerence between the beliefs about the leader and those about
the followers is 1.01 in FI and 0.28 in the PI treatment. The average distance
between the followers’ contributions and their beliefs about their teammates is
1.56 in FI compared to 0.26 in PI. Finally, the gap between the belief about the
leader and the average contribution is 2.58 in FI and 0.54 in PI. All diﬀerences
between the treatments are signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level.13
In summary it can be stated that the diﬀerent evolution of contributions is
result of several eﬀects that occur under no information conditions. First of
all, the leaders’ example has a stronger inﬂuence on followers’ contributions if
13All comparisions between two treatments are tested with the Mann-Whithney-U-rest, two-
tailed, exact.
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the later do not have a second source of information. Furthermore, the missing
feedback about the teammates’ behavior conﬂates the followers’ beliefs about
leaders and teammates. Finally, contributions converge towards beliefs.
The remaining part of this section reports the results from the second phase,
in which all group members, including the former leader, contribute simulta-
neously. Figure 3.4 shows the average contributions separated with regard to
the former player types. Although contributions in the PI treatment (9.41) are
still signiﬁcantly (p < 0.1) above those in FI (4.97), both treatments exhibit a
considerable downward trend.
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Figure 3.4: Former leader and follower contributions in phase 2
Obviously, the change in followers’ belief structure that is induced by lead-
ing by example, cannot withstand the incentive structure of a standard public
goods game. The average contributions provided by former leaders are only
slightly above the ones of the group members and the distance does not dif-
fer between the treatments. During the second phase the gap between the
treatments contracts from 5.38 in round 21 to 1.63 in round 40.
These results receive further support from the panel regression presented
in Table 3.5, which shows that the process of belief updating is very similar
in both treatments. The only considerable determinant is the feedback about
others’ contributions and previous beliefs do not have any impact.
The additional explanatory variable (Avg. C-B in P1) is thought to measure
the eﬀects of subjects’ former attitude observed in the ﬁrst phase. The ratio-
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nale behind this is that followers might have formed a certain picture about
their teammates, which also persists in a modiﬁed environment. As can be
seen, there is no eﬀect of former attitudes on belief updating in the second
phase.
Dv: belief → follower Full info (FI) Private info (PI)
Round -0.094* (0.042) -0.098** (0.042)
Feedback 0.464*** (0.159) 0.666*** (0.173)
Avg. C − P in P1 0.092 (0.055) -0.036 (0.039)
Cons 4.612*** (1.013) 4.911*** (1.831)
R2 0.43 0.57
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clusters in
groups) in parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%. (N =
456)
Table 3.5: Belief forming in phase 2
However, there is a considerable inﬂuence at the beginning of the simul-
taneous part of the game. The average distance (phase 1) between subjects’
contributions and their beliefs about the other followers is highly correlated
with their initial diﬀerence in the second phase.14 Thus, it appears that sub-
ject’s transfer the attitudes which they formed during the ﬁrst phase, into the
second phase of the game but change it afterwards with regard to the new
decision situation.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides quantitative support for the eﬀect of leadership on the
belief structure of followers. The experimental design is focused on the in-
teractions between leaders and followers and allows investigating a situation
in which private information becomes an additional source of power for the
leader. Based on the argumentation that has been put forward by Foss (2001),
it sheds some light on the question whether leadership can substitute common
knowledge and change the followers’ attitudes towards their teammates.
The results show that leadership under private information conditions does
not only change followers’ beliefs but also their cooperative behavior. First,
14Spearman’s rank correlation, FI: ρ = 0.833, p < 0.05 and PI: ρ = 0.706, p < 0.05
60 3. Feedback and leading by example
followers do no longer suspect their teammates to contribute less than the
leader, as they do under full information conditions. Second, their own con-
tribution preferences are no longer selﬁshly biased, i.e. they do not want to
contribute below their beliefs’ about other followers. As a consequence average
contributions exceed those in the full information setting.
However, these changes in beliefs and behavior are not sustainable. The
result from the second part of the experiment, in which all group members de-
cided simultaneously without the example from a leader, shows that subjects
readapt their expectations quickly with regard to the new decision environ-
ment. The process of belief forming and the contribution preferences drop
back to the standards of the public good game and in consequence the contri-
butions diminish over time.
With regard to theoretical approaches of transformational leadership, our
results support the assumption that there is an additional eﬀect of personal
leading beyond the mere management of resources. After all, the results also
reveal several new questions. The eﬀect of leaders’ contribution preferences
could be investigated in further treatments with preselected leaders and might
contribute further insight into the interdependences between leaders’ attitudes
and their ability to transform the beliefs of their followers. The question
whether the transformation process can be accelerated through means of addi-
tional authority might be answered with a treatment in which the leader can
draw on sanctions to discipline the followers.
Chapter 4
The eﬀects of uncertainty and
exaggerated feedback1
Then if anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of
the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either
with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for
the public good. (Plato)
4.1 Introduction
The provision of feedback is common practice both in the public as well as in
the private sector. Politicians do not become tired of emphasizing what they
have achieved and how well for example the economy and the labor market are
developing. Managers report statistics with key performance indicators that
prove how successful their departments and companies are. Hearing all this -
as stimulating and mood-elevating as it sounds- who did not sometimes notice
the shadow of a doubt whether the provided information might not be only
part of the whole truth and the picture that is painted might be too optimistic?
Related literature shows that the issue of false or imperfect information
provision has intensely been studied by economists. The major part of existing
research focuses on two aspects. The ﬁrst is whether people provide false or
imperfect information in order to increase their individual proﬁt and how their
1 This chapter is based on the working paper “Eﬀects of informational uncertainty on cooper-
ation in social dilemmas”, joint work with Mareike Hoﬀmann and Bettina Rockenbach. All
authors contributed equally.
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partners react to that behavior. The second aspect deals with the question
whether people provide false or imperfect information to increase collective
proﬁt.
Results of experimental research show that people indeed provide false and
imperfect information in order to increase their individual proﬁt. In dictator
games, subjects announce that a split was determined by chance instead of
admitting that they actively chose a split that favored themselves (Ackert,
Church, Kuang, Qi, and Li 2007). In ultimatum games, proposers cheat about
the size of the pie and responders cheat about their outside option when given
the chance to do so (Croson, Boles, and Murnighan 2003). Concerning the con-
sequences in the short run, responder threats and lies increase the size of oﬀers
made, while proposer lies decrease them. In the long run, after the revelation
of false information, proposers’ lies both increase oﬀers and decrease accep-
tances. Responders’ revealed lies lead to smaller, but not signiﬁcantly smaller
oﬀers. Besides also ﬁnding support for people’s propensity to lie in order to
increase individual proﬁt, Gneezy (2005) argues that people are sensitive to
their gain when making the decision to lie. According to Gneezy, people care
less for a lie the bigger their personal gain from that lie is. Further, they do
not only care how much they gain from that lie but also how much their part-
ner will lose. Hurkens and Kartik (2009) reinterpret Gneezy’s results claiming
that people belong to one of two types. They either never lie or they lie as
long as the outcome obtained by lying is preferred to the outcome obtained by
telling the truth. According to their reasoning, in the latter case people will
always lie and the decision to do so is not inﬂuenced by considerations about
relative changes of the outcome for the partner.
With regard to the aspect of the provision of false information to increase
the collective proﬁt, there is evidence that leaders in public goods provide false
information about the MPCR2 in order to induce cooperation and gain eﬃcient
payoﬀs (Serra-Garcia, Damme, and Potters 2011). Despite ﬁndings like these,
to the best of our knowledge, there is hardly any research on the question how
people react to the revelation of having received false information that served
to increase collective proﬁt.
We set out to answer this question by investigating contribution behavior
2 marginal per capita return
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in a public good game with diﬀerent feedback conditions. Due to our intention
to exaggerate the feedback in two treatments we had to inform all subjects
that the information about the other group members’ contribution displayed
on their screen might deviate from the actual values. In order to avoid con-
founding exaggeration and uncertainty we ﬁrst have to investigate the eﬀect
of mere uncertainty. In the next step we analyze how contribution behavior
is inﬂuenced by feedback about partners’ contributions that is either exagger-
ated in absolute terms or in relation to subjects’ own contribution, given it is
common knowledge that the feedback might deviate from actual contributions.
Finally, we analyze how the revelation that the feedback was exaggerated and
will continue to be so aﬀects future contribution behavior. Our results show
that uncertainty lowers the average contributions, while exaggerated feedback
leads to higher contributions. However, it also turns out that uncertainty cre-
ates selﬁsh biased behavior, i.e. subjects prefer to contribute less than they
expect from the other group members. We also ﬁnd that exaggerated feed-
back, which prevents subjects’ from feeling exploited by others results in stable
cooperation on a high level. Comparing the two types of exaggeration reveals
that the behavior of subjects who received negative feedback is a main reason
for the downward trend in repeated games.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section
(4.2) we explain the diﬀerent treatment conditions in detail. Afterwards the
predictions, derived from former experimental results and models of coopera-
tion in repeated games, are discussed (section 4.3). Section 4.4 presents and
discusses our experimental results and the last section (4.5) concludes.
4.2 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was designed as a standard public good game. Subjects were
assigned to groups of four and randomly distributed to the baseline treatment
with perfect feedback (PF) and the test treatments with imperfect feedback
(IF). Each treatment was conducted with twelve groups and therefore provides
twelve independent observations. The experiment was run at the eLab of
the University of Erfurt. 192 subjects were recruited using the Orsee system
(Greiner 2004). All participants were placed in separate compartments and
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the interaction with the other group members was done anonymously via the
computer interface. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were paid privately after the
end of the experimental session with an exchange rate of 1 Euro, for each 80
tokens. A session lasted approximately 70 minutes and average earnings were
11.75 Euro.
4.2.1 Procedure
The experiment was made up of two phases, each consisting of 20 identical
rounds. Prior to the ﬁrst period subjects only received instructions for phase
1 and were informed that there will be a second phase and that payoﬀs and
decisions will be independent in the two phases.3 Each subject received an
endowment of 20 tokens (ei) per round. At the beginning of every round sub-
jects had to state their belief about the other group members’ next average
contribution decision. After that they made a decision about how many tokens
to contribute (ci) to the public good. Tokens contributed were deducted from
a player’s private account, multiplied by 1.6 and evenly distributed among all
four members (N) of a group. Tokens kept remained in player’s private ac-
count. Equation 4.1 summarizes the individual payoﬀ-function and emphasizes
that every contributed token yields 0.4 token for the player notwithstanding
whether it was contributed by himself or any other group member. In other
words, every token contributed by the player generates a return of 0.4 for the
all group members, whereas every kept token has a return of 1 for the player.
Πi = ei − ci + Cj, with Cj = 0.4
4∑
i=1
ci (4.1)
4.2.2 Treatments
After all members of a group had made their decisions, subjects were informed
about the average contribution of the other group members in every round.
This feedback varied by treatment. In the PF treatment the feedback always
displayed the actual contributions. The mere eﬀect of uncertainty about the
3 See the instructions in Appendix A.4.1
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correctness of the feedback on contribution behavior was analyzed in treatment
IF0. Here, subjects were informed that the feedback might deviate from ac-
tual values while in fact the displayed feedback always corresponded to actual
contributions, i.e. was not exaggerated.4 In treatment IF25 the feedback over-
estimated the other group members’ contributions uniformly by about 25%
based on the average inputs of the remaining group members. More precisely
the feedback was calculated as the sum of others’ contributions multiplied by
1.25 and divided by 3. To avoid unrealistic information the maximum feedback
was limited to 20 (the endowment) and the exaggerated sum was rounded to
be a credible quotient of a division by three. Since our main purpose was to
analyze whether the announcement of higher values fosters cooperation and to
avoid very small and hardly eﬀective exaggerations, we implemented a mini-
mum feedback of ﬁve. At the end of phase one of every treatment, subjects
saw a summary of the ﬁrst phase that provided information about their own
average contributions, the average exaggerated feedback if relevant and the
actual average contributions of the other three group members.5 After seeing
the summary, all the subjects in IF0 and IF25 were asked to rate the received
feedback with regard to moral and monetary aspects. The ﬁrst question was
“How do you evaluate the deviation between the presented and the actual
feedback information from a moral point of view?” The second question was
“How do you evaluate the deviation between the presented and the actual
feedback information with respect to your own monetary payoﬀ?” Both ques-
tions were answered on a seven point scale from negative (-3) to positive (3).
At the beginning of phase 2 there was another short introduction read out to
the subjects to inform them that the second part of the experiment will be
identical to phase 1 and that they are a member of the same group again.
In other words in phase 2 subjects in the IF0 treatment now knew that the
feedback they received was correct and subjects in the IF25 treatment knew
that the feedback was systematically overestimated by about 25% and that the
overestimation would continue in phase 2. Table 4.1 summarizes the diﬀerent
4 The original sentence from the instructions was: “From the beginning of the second period
you will be informed about the average contribution of the other three members of your group
in the previous period at the beginning of each period. Please note that this information
might deviate from the true contribution!”
5 For an example of a screenshot see Appendix A.4.2
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feedback conditions.
Treatment Uncertainty Exaggeration Feedback
PF No No Cj / 3
IFO Yes No 1.25 Cj / 3
IF25 Yes Yes Cj / 3
Table 4.1: Summary of feedback conditions
4.3 Equilibria and predictions
In this section we ﬁrst discuss the predictions given by standard theory of ra-
tional selﬁsh decision makers and the inﬂuence of inequality and risk aversion
as well as uncertainty on subjects’ strategies in the game. We then explore the
arguments of conditional cooperation towards our research questions stated
above and ﬁnally specify some predictions to render our questions more pre-
cisely.
4.3.1 Equlibria
In a one-stage public-good game, without any means to foster cooperation, the
rational selﬁsh player will contribute nothing independent of what she beliefs
about the other group members’ input. Therefore the Nash-equilibrium will
be no cooperation at all. This is also true for every single stage of ﬁnitely
repeated game (Friedman 1986).
However, experimental research reveals that only a limited number of play-
ers in public good games behave this way, especially if the game is repeated
for a known number of rounds. Laboratory public goods experiments typi-
cally show that subjects contribute roughly one half of their endowment in
ﬁrst rounds and start to decrease their input over time until there is almost
no cooperation at the end of the game (Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). One
prominent explanation for this pattern is the approach of conditionally cooper-
ative behavior (for an overview see Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). According
to this approach, people are willing to contribute as long as they believe (or ob-
serve) that other group members will do the same and as long as the feedback -
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used to update these beliefs - provides no reason to expect lower contributions
in the future. This behavior is commonly referred to as conditional cooper-
ation. In a recent study Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) provide empirical
evidence that exposes conditional behavior as imperfect because subjects are
selﬁshly biased, i.e. they prefer to contribute a little less than the other group
members. This seems to be one major reason for declining contributions.
Another explanation for the adaption of subjects’ behavior towards others’
contributions derives from the models of inequity aversion presented by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Both models claim that
behavior is not only driven by a subject’s own monetary outcome but also by
the relative outcome (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) and the non-monetary utility
created or destroyed by payoﬀ diﬀerences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Subjects
evaluate their payoﬀs in comparison to their partners’ earnings and try to
reduce inequity. Despite the fact that the models of inequity aversion focus on
the players’ payoﬀ distribution rather than on their beliefs, these comparisons
lead to similar contribution patterns in public good games as predicted by
conditional cooperation. Since the partner’s payoﬀ is calculated from the same
contributions that are used to display the feedback, exaggerating the feedback
will also lead to higher payoﬀs from the other group members’ point of view.
A further approach was put forward by Kreps et al. (1982). This model
predicts at least temporarily cooperation in repeated games even if there are
no individual social preferences. They argue that there might be some sort
of incomplete information about the other players strategies either in the way
that at least one group member plays tit-for-tat or that others might have ad-
ditional utility from acting altruistic. It is not necessary that these ’irrational
players’ actually participate as long as all subjects belief in their existence.
The beliefs are updated with respect to the information gathered about other
group members’ contribution behavior. Under those conditions cooperative
strategies might emerge even among absolutely selﬁsh players as long as they
expect to gain proﬁt from others’ reciprocal behavior. Cooperative behavior
might emerge even more often if the probability subjects attribute to the ex-
istence of irrational players is higher. Since exaggerated feedback partly hides
the selﬁsh nature of their teammates and distort the belief updating, subjects
might cooperate for a longer time to gain proﬁt the expected reciprocal behav-
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ior of other group members. A study presented by Croson (2007) shows that
the vast majority of subjects (about 92%) indeed behave in a reciprocal way
rather than acting as deﬁned in altruism or commitment models. Neugebauer
et al. (2009) falsify the strategic play hypotheses (Selten and Stöcker 1986;
Kreps et al. 1982; Sonnemans et al. 1999) and present additional evidence for
reciprocal or conditional behavior.
Further, there is experimental evidence that uncertainty reduces cooper-
ative behavior in public-goods games. Wit and Wilke (1998) demonstrate
that environmental uncertainty about the provision point of a public-good has
detrimental eﬀects on cooperation, if subjects also face social uncertainty, i.e.
uncertainty about their partners’ cooperative behavior. Au et al. (1998) show
that a greater uncertainty about the outcome of a public good decreases coop-
eration, if subjects perceive that their contribution is critical for the outcome
of the public good. A recent study by Brennan et al. (2008) also reveals a
negative correlation between contributions and risk level in a public goods
game.
4.3.2 Predictions
Implementing feedback exaggeration without misleading the participants obvi-
ously creates an extra amount of uncertainty that added to the usual inevitable
question how the other group members might behave. We ﬁrst analyze the
mere eﬀect of uncertainty, i.e. without exaggeration. The uncertainty in the
IF0 treatment that is caused by the imperfect feedback is similar to the risk
subjects face in Brennan et al. (2008) study insofar as subjects know that they
will not be perfectly informed. We expect that subjects account for the higher
uncertainty level in the IF0 treatment than in the PF treatment by discounting
their contribution decisions by some amount to cover against the possibility
that actual contributions of fellow players are smaller than announced by the
feedback. Thus we assume that contributions are smaller in the IF0 treatment
than in the PF treatment.
The combination of uncertainty and exaggerated feedback in IF25 might
lead to the two possible outcomes predicted. As the available information
and thus the uncertainty in phase 1 is the same in IF0 and in IF25, we can
again apply the logic of uncertainty reducing contributions to the public-good
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(Au et al. 1998; Wit and Wilke 1998; Brennan et al. 2008). This means that
even if the announced feedback is exaggerated, due to the existing uncertainty
contributions might be lower in the IF25 treatment than in the PF treatment.
On the other hand, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) ﬁndings suggest that
people are conditionally cooperative and contribute slightly less than what they
believe that the other group members will contribute. The feedback mecha-
nism in the IF25 treatment exaggerates others’ actual contributions which in
turn might raise beliefs. Research on decision making has shown that un-
der uncertainty people often apply simplifying heuristics which can result in
anchoring eﬀects, i.e. assimilations of a numeric estimate to a previously con-
sidered standard (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Galinsky and Mussweiler
2001; Mussweiler 2000). Although our feedback is imperfect it is the only infor-
mation that the subjects receive and therefore might cause such an anchoring
eﬀect with regard to the belief about other players’ contributions. If the an-
choring eﬀect is stronger than the cooperation-decreasing eﬀect of uncertainty,
inputs to the public good should be higher in the IF25 treatment than in the
PF treatment.
After phase 1, the information structure is the same in IF25 and IF0. While
subjects in the IF0 treatment know that they can rely on the feedback infor-
mation, subjects in the IF25 treatment now know that they need to discount
25% of the feedback in order to calculate their partners’ actual contributions.
Again applying the argument of conditional cooperation, we expect that sub-
jects adjust their behavior and discount the feedback information. If this is
the case, contributions in phase 2 should not diﬀer between the treatments
and second phase contributions in IF25 should be below those of the ﬁrst 20
rounds.
If subjects understand that the exaggeration mechanism might induce higher
contributions among conditionally cooperative players and at the same time
a higher overall payoﬀ, they should evaluate the exaggeration positive from a
monetary point of view. However, research provides evidence that people are
generally lying-averse (e.g. Brandts and Charness 2003; Holm and Kawagoe
2010; Gneezy 2005). Therefore we expect that despite the monetary advan-
tage the exaggeration will be evaluated negatively from a moral point of view,
indicating that the end does not justify the means.
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4.4 Results and discussion
The results are presented in two subsections according to the two phases of
the experiment. The ﬁrst one focuses on the contribution behavior and the
changes in beliefs about other subjects’ contributions under the diﬀerent feed-
back conditions. In the second subsection we focus on the long-run eﬀects of
exaggerated feedback und discuss the inﬂuence from revelation after phase 1.
First we turn to the question whether uncertainty reduces cooperation. Figure
4.1 shows the average contributions during the ﬁrst phase. In comparison to
the control-treatment with perfect feedback the contributions are signiﬁcantly
(p < 0.1)6 lower under imperfect feedback conditions (average contribution of
4.9 in IF0 and 6.5 in PF).
With view to the results presented by Wit and Wilke (1998) this diﬀerence
seems to conﬁrm the detrimental eﬀect of uncertainty on cooperation in social
dilemma situations. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the uncertainty
that we implemented in IF0 is broader than the uncertainty presented by Wit
and Wilke because our feedback mechanism does not diﬀerentiate between
environmental and social uncertainty.
Next we analyze whether exaggeration is able to increase cooperative be-
havior in the presence of uncertainty. The second treatment (IF25) maintains
the uncertainty about the feedback but exaggerates the other players’ average
contribution uniformly by about 25%. In comparison to the situation with
mere uncertainty (IF0) this leads to higher contributions.
On average subjects who received exaggerated feedback contributed 6.8 to-
ken and therewith 1.8 token more than those who participated in the IF0
treatment without exaggeration (see Figure 4.2). This diﬀerence is only weakly
signiﬁcant in the later rounds of phase 1 (round 5 - 20 p < 0.1) but not signif-
icant over all rounds of the ﬁrst phase (round 1 - 20 p = 0.198). Compared to
our baseline treatment (PF), the exaggeration mechanism is not suﬃcient to
overcome the negative eﬀect of uncertainty.
Subjects’ contributions to the public good in IF25 are not signiﬁcantly (p =
1) diﬀerent from contributions under perfect feedback conditions (see Figure
2b). While the mere uncertainty in the IF0 treatment reduces contributions by
6 All comparisons between two treatments are tested as independent samples with the MWU-
test (exact, two tailed) and 12 independent observations in each treatment.
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Figure 4.1: Average contributions in phase 1 under perfect feedback (PF) and
imperfect feedback without exaggeration (IF0)
about 24% on average compared to the control treatment PF, the exaggeration
in IF25 raises the contributions by about almost the same scale (26%). To shed
some further light on the diﬀerences induced by uncertainty and exaggeration
Figure 4.3 shows the average variances of contributions in phase 1. Especially
in the ﬁrst 10 rounds both treatments with imperfect feedback show a higher
level of variance in contributions than the treatment with perfect feedback.
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Figure 4.2: The eﬀects of uncertainty and exaggeration on average contribu-
tions
The contribution variance in IF0 is 36.6 and even 41.4 in IF25 while it
is only 26.7 in the PF treatment. Levene’s test rejects (p < 0.001) the hy-
pothesis of equal variances under perfect and imperfect feedback conditions.
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The information that feedback might deviate from actual values does not only
lower contributions on average but also increases the scattering of contribution
decisions no matter whether there actually is an exaggeration or not.
The next section deals with the long-run eﬀects and subjects’ evaluation of
the exaggeration. After revealing the exaggeration mechanism and the actual
contributions at the end of phase 1 subjects were informed that neither their
group nor the feedback conditions would be changed during the second phase.
After that there is no informational diﬀerence between the PF and the IF25
treatment (and also not in IF0) in phase 2 because there is no uncertainty in
any of the treatments, since subjects now know how to calculate the actual
average contribution of the other group members, contributions are diﬀerent
(see Figure 4.4). Subjects in the IF25 treatment contributed signiﬁcantly less
than subjects in PF (p < 0.05). The decline of cooperation between phase
one and phase two is signiﬁcant in all three treatments (p < 0.001 in IF25,
p < 0.001 in IF0 and p < 0.05 in PF)7.
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Figure 4.3: Average variances in contributions in phase 1
The fact that contributions in phase 2 are lower in the IF25 treatment
than in the PF treatment, although the decline from phase 1 to phase 2 was
signiﬁcant in both treatments and the contributions did not diﬀer in phase
1, reﬂects the strong negative eﬀect that the revelation of the exaggeration
7 All comparisons within one treatment are tested as related samples with the Wilcoxon test
(exact, two-tailed) and 12 independent observations.
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mechanism had on subjects’ contribution behavior.
The act of overestimating contributions might have lowered subjects’ per-
ceived sense of obligation to contribute and might to have shifted their focus
on the maximization of their individual beneﬁts. The ﬁnding is also in line
with the results presented by Wilson and Kelling (1982) that became known
as the “broken window theory” and go back to an experiment conducted by
the psychologist Zimbardo in (1973). Zimbardo abandoned one car without
license plates and with the front lid open in the Bronx and another identical
car in Palo Alto. The car in the Bronx was completely destroyed within one
day while the one in Palo Alto remained untouched for a week. However,
after breaking one of the windows, the car in Palo Alto was also completely
desolated only within a few hours (Zimbardo 1973). Thus, criminal activity
substantially increased even in this otherwise quiet neighborhood as soon as
there were cues that enhanced this behavior. Likewise, the act of providing
exaggerated feedback information might have triggered subjects to engage in
less moral, i.e. less collectively beneﬁcial behavior in the second phase.
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Figure 4.4: Average contributions in phase 1 and 2
Moral evaluations of the exaggerated feedback are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from monetary evaluations in IF25 (p = 0.941) after phase 1. Although the
correlation between the two evaluations is not signiﬁcant (r = 0.168, p =
0.255), the exaggeration mechanism is negatively evaluated from both points
of view by about 40% of subjects. Obviously, the exaggeration mechanism was
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not appreciated as a means that is justiﬁed by the end because it served to
increase contributions and collective beneﬁt.
4.4.1 Beliefs
A surprising diﬀerence between the treatments can be found if the beliefs that
subjects stated about the others’ contribution before they announced their
own contribution decision are taken into account. Figure 4.5 shows the average
contributions, beliefs and feedbacks in phase 1 under perfect feedback. It can
be seen that there are no noteworthy diﬀerences.
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Figure 4.5: The diﬀerence between belief and contribution in PF and IF25.
Under imperfect feedback conditions, when subjects know that the displayed
feedback might not represent actual values, one might expect a visible devia-
tion of beliefs from the feedback that was received. Contrary to this expecta-
tion Figure 4.5 shows that there is a close connection between the presented
feedback and beliefs. However, subjects systematically discount (Wilcoxon,
p < 0.001)8 their own contributions from the input they expect from their
group members.
If this discount is driven by the uncertainty it should diminish in the second
phase and indeed the removal of feedback uncertainty reduces the gap between
beliefs and contribution (p < 0.05). In the second phase subjects know how
the exaggeration mechanism works and do not need to subtract an amount
from their beliefs in order to cover against the uncertainty that the feedback
8 The discount from belief to contribution is also signiﬁcant in the IF0 treatment (Wilcoxon:
p < 0.001) and the diﬀerences are signiﬁcantly higher in those treatments with imperfect
feedback than with perfect feedback. (MWU: PF/IF0 p < 0.05 and PF/IF25 p < 0.001).
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might deviate from actual values anymore. While the average distance be-
tween feedback and contribution remains unchanged due to the exaggeration
mechanism, the average belief moves away from the presented feedback and
towards contributions (Figure 4.6).
One might argue that not the absence of uncertainty but the possibility to
calculate the actual average contribution reduces the distance between beliefs
and contribution in the second phase. This is doubtful for two reasons. The
ﬁrst one is that the treatment with mere uncertainty (IF0) also shows a signif-
icant distance between beliefs and contributions (p < 0.001) in phase 1, which
diminishes, just like in the IF25 treatment, once the uncertainty is removed in
the second phase (p < 0.05).
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Figure 4.6: Beliefs and contributions under imperfect feedback conditions
The second reason can be found in the exaggeration treatment (IF25) itself.
Although subjects can easily calculate actual values by subtracting 25%, the
average beliefs are signiﬁcantly above that calculated value (p < 0.001). Since
this is not the case under perfect feedback conditions (PF) the diﬀerences in
the IF treatments seem to be a result of some remaining uncertainty rather
than a result of imperfect conditional cooperation.
To proceed with more detailed analysis of the inﬂuence from feedback on
the beliefs and contributions we use the model applied by Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010). It describes the individuals’ belief about others contribution
76 4. The eﬀects of uncertainty and exaggerated feedback
in the next round as a function (4.2) of the displayed average contributions of
the other group members in the previous round (feedback) and the subjects’
own belief in the previous round (Belieft−1).
belieft = α1Belieft−1 + α2feedback (4.2)
Table 4.2 presents the result of the panel regression for the diﬀerent informa-
tion conditions. The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation method,
which we also applied to this model (Arellano and Bond 1991), might pro-
vide a better ﬁt to our data structure but the reported estimates seem to be
inconsistent (signiﬁcant second order correlation in the residuals, p < 0.05,
Arellano-Bond test). As a consequence we forego the interpretation of the
Arellano-Bond model and report the results from the panel regression.
Dv: belief Cert Uncertain Joint
(N = 912) (N = 1824) (N = 2736)
Round -0.017 -0.006 -0.008
(0.013) (0.015) (0.009)
Feedback 0.580*** 0.348***
(0.023) (0.055)
Belieft−1 0.325*** 0.586***
(0.025) (0.060)
Certain x feedback 0.589***
(0.021)
Certain x Belieft−1 0.334***
(0.023)
Uncertain x feedback 0.345***
(0.055)
Uncertain x Belieft−1 0.584***
(0.059)
Cons 0.686** 0.372 0.454***
(0.290) (0.325) (0.253)
R2 0.68 0.65 0.65
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (12 clusters in
groups) in parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
Table 4.2: Belief forming under certain and uncertain informa-
tion conditions
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The Cert model conﬁrms that the results presented by Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010) for repeated one-shot interaction (stranger matching) also hold
true for repeated situations with partner matching. Applying the same model
to the treatments with imperfect feedback (Uncert: IF0 and IF25) reveals a
shift in the inﬂuences on subjects’ belief. In contrast to the perfect feedback
conditions the impact from others’ contribution in the previous period drops
down while the inﬂuence from subjects’ prior beliefs rises at the same time.
To rule out that this inversion occurs by chance we estimated both conditions
in a JOINT model and ﬁnd that feedbacks’ inﬂuence is signiﬁcantly lower
(p < 0.001)9 if subjects are in doubt about the information they receive about
others’ contributions. All the more subjects rely on their own prior beliefs
under Uncert conditions (p < 0.001). This can also be seen as an additional
explanation for the limited eﬀect of exaggerated feedback on contribution level.
The next step is to investigate the determinants of subjects’ contribution
decision. We use a model similar to that applied by Croson (2007) and extend
it by an additional independent variable, which is thought to be similar to the
predicted contribution variable used by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). Thus
subjects’ contribution in the current round is described as a function (4.3) of
subjects’ ﬁrst contribution (Contributionit=1) and the belief about other group
members’ contribution (Beliefit).
contributiont = β1belieft + β2predictedcontribution (4.3)
Comparing the ﬁrst four models in Table 4.3 reveals two things. First,
adding subjects’ ﬁrst contribution as a determinant for later contributions im-
proves the predictions in both feedback conditions (Cert+ and Uncert+). In
both cases the unexplained variance is reduced and the constant term is no
longer signiﬁcant under certain information conditions. As with the belief
forming there is a shift in inﬂuences if the information about other players’
contributions contains uncertainty (Uncert+). The belief about others’ con-
tributions loses inﬂuence on subjects’ decisions if it is based on imperfect feed-
back. At the same time the initial and unconditional contribution in round 1 at
9 Wald-test for linear hypotheses with H0 = equal parameters.
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least partly substitutes that inﬂuence. As can be seen from the JOINT model
the explanation provided by belief under uncertain conditions is signiﬁcantly
below (p < 0.001)10 the one provided under certain conditions. The opposite
is true for the impact from ﬁrst round contributions that inﬂuence current
contributions signiﬁcantly stronger (p < 0.01) under uncertain conditions.
So far our results show that the exaggeration of group members’ contribu-
tions not only fosters cooperative behavior but also alters the determinants
of belief forming and contribution decisions due to the uncertainty it induces
to the feedback. Uncertainty systematically reduces the impact from other-
regarding variables (Belief) and raises the importance of self-regarding vari-
ables (First contribution). However, we also found that a uniform exaggeration
of the average group members’ contributions by about 25% is not suﬃcient to
overcome the drop in contributions caused by the associated feedback uncer-
tainty.
If subjects are in doubt about the reliability of information they receive,
the exaggeration cannot induce a higher level of cooperation in comparison to
the perfect feedback condition. In the long run, after the revelation of actual
contributions, subjects are even less cooperative if the exaggeration mechanism
is further applied. This might be due to the fact that the exaggeration is
neither appreciated from a monetary nor from a moral point of view and rather
increases the tendency to engage in less moral and more selﬁsh behavior. To
disentangle the opposing eﬀects of uncertainty and exaggeration we changed
the feedback mechanisms in an additional treatment that is presented in the
following section.
4.4.2 Follow up: Subject based exaggeration
As subjects’ contribution behavior to the public good in phase 1 is almost
the same in PF as in IF25 although the given information is not the same,
there must be a diﬀerence in the way the feedback is processed. For this
reason we analyzed how subjects adjust their contribution behavior in the
next round depending on the feedback they had received. Figure 4.7 shows
that in each feedback round contributors can be classiﬁed into three types.
Subjects who received the feedback that their input to the public good was
10Wald-test for linear hypotheses with H0 = equal parameters.
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Dv: belief Cert Uncert Cert+ Uncert+ Joint
N 960 1920 960 1824 2736
Round -0.059* -0.161*** -0.050* -0.162*** -0.129***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Belief 0.763*** 0.447*** 0.761*** 0.541***
(0.034) (0.056) (0.034) (0.020)
1st contr. 0.159*** 0.368***
(0.044) (0.016)
Belieft−1 0.325*** 0.586***
(0.025) (0.060)
1st contr (C) 0.199***
(0.037)
Belief (C) 0.702***
(0.035)
1st contr. (U) 0.355***
(0.055)
Belief (U) 0.465***
(0.057)
Cons 1.893*** 4.291*** 0.154 1.103* 0.774
(0.445) (0.477) (0.572) (0.576) (0.468)
R2 0.42 0.36 0.45 0.48 0.47
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (12 clusters in groups) in
parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%. Wald-test: equal coeﬃcients
for Leaders’ contribution in C2. F = 2.82 p < 0.1.
Table 4.3: Contribution decisions under certain and uncertain information
conditions
below the average of the other group members’ input do not have the feeling
that the other players might have taken advantage of them, i.e. they are no
suckers anyway and are called “IF25 below average”. These subjects adjust
their contributions in the next round slightly upwards by 2-3 points. Subjects
who received the feedback that their own contribution was above the average
of their group members’ contribution are the ones who experience the feeling
that the other players took advantage of them. These players adjust their next
round contributions strongly downwards. They are called “IF25 above average
aware” in Figure 4.7. Finally, there are subjects who actually were suckers but
who were prevented from knowing it because the 25% exaggeration increased
the feedback of the average group members’ contribution to an amount that
was just above the subject’s own contribution. As Figure 4.7 clearly shows,
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these players, called “IF25 above average unaware”, do hardly change their
contributions in the next round and their behavior does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from those of the “IF25 below average” subjects (p = 0.561). The diﬀerence in
the adjustment to the feedback between “IF25 above average unaware” suckers
and “IF25 above average aware” suckers is signiﬁcant (p < 0.5).
Thus, the analysis of the feedback adjustment seems to show that the down-
ward shift is mainly driven by those subjects who experience feedback that
points to exploitative behavior of their team mates, i.e. by strong downward
adjustment of “IF25 above average aware” suckers.
Two other possible explanations for the downward shift in contributions are
presented by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). The ﬁrst one is the existence
of free riding subjects who contribute zero or a very small amount of tokens
and therefore lower the average group contributions. The other one is due to
the observation that majority of people behave as imperfect conditional coop-
erators and contribute (a little) less than they expect from their group mem-
bers and therewith also lower the average group contributions. However our
data suggest that there is also a relevant diﬀerence between the subjects who
contributed below that average and those who contributed above. Since the
initial contribution preference measured by the contribution belief ratio in the
ﬁrst round does not diﬀer between our treatments (Jonckheere-Terpstra-Test
p = 0.556)11, we can rule out that subjects initially have diﬀerent contribution
preferences depending on what they know about the reliability of the presented
feedback.
Departing from our assumption that suckers were responsible for the decline
of cooperation, we predict that preventing subjects from feeling to be the sucker
will lead to an increase in cooperation. In order to test whether this is true,
we conducted a follow up study where all subjects whose contribution was
above the group members’ average were prevented from realizing that they
were the suckers (IF no suckers). The experimental design of this treatment
is identical to the IF25 treatment except for the exaggeration mechanism.
Instead of exaggerating other group members’ contributions uniformly by 25%,
the exaggeration in IF no sucker was based on each subject’s own contribution.
11The same holds true for ﬁrst round contributions (p = 0.972) and ﬁrst round beliefs (p =
0.513). The contribution belief ration is used here since it is comparable to the “predicted
contribution” variable applied by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010).
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Figure 4.7: The inﬂuence from exaggeration on contribution adaption
We announced subjects’ own contribution as feedback to every subject that
contributed more than the other group members did on average. Otherwise
the true average contribution of the other group members was announced.
In other words, no subject received a feedback that indicates exploitation by
other group members. As in the other IF-treatments subjects were told that
the displayed feedback value might deviate from real one. It is important to
mention that this feedback mechanism does not rule out a downward shift
driven by imperfect conditional cooperation or free riders. If the subjects have
selﬁsh biased contribution preferences, there should still be a decline in average
contributions, since each conditional contributor prefers to contribute below
his or her belief about the others.
Indeed our results show that if no subject has the feeling to be exploited
by other group members the downward shift can be avoided and contributions
remain on the initial level. Contributions in the IF no sucker treatment are
signiﬁcantly higher the ones in IF0 (p < 0.001). Indeed there is no cue that
contributions follow a continuous downward trend in phase 1 (see Figure 4.8).
Neither do the last 5 rounds diﬀer from the ﬁrst 5 (p = 0.775) nor is there a sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the second half of phase 1 (p = 0.677).
One might speculate that the inversed u-shape might be a result of growing
mistrust towards the announced contributions of other group members. While
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subjects follow the exaggerated feedback in the ﬁrst 10 rounds they start to
mistrust the ongoing high values and start lowering their contributions in the
second half. However, this interpretation is not supported by the data at all.
The regression coeﬃcients hardly change between the ﬁrst and the second
half of phase 1, neither with regard to the belief forming12 nor with view on
the determinant of actual contribution decisions.13 Instead, the well known
end-game-eﬀect might provide a better explanation for the decline in contri-
butions at the end of phase 1. Further, although the informational uncertainty
given in the introduction was the same in the IF25 and the IF no sucker treat-
ment, a post hoc calculation shows that the average amount by which group
members’ contributions were overestimated in IF no sucker was only 22.67%.
This amount is less than the amount that was necessary to lift cooperation
in IF25 to the level that was achieved in the control treatment PF without
uncertainty about the feedback (25%).
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Figure 4.8: Average contributions in IF no sucker in phase 1 and 2
Following the same reasoning as outlined in section 4.3, we assume that
cooperation will decline once the exaggeration mechanism is revealed.14 In the
12The coeﬃcient for feedback as explanatory variable for subjects’ beliefs changes from 0.409
in round 1-10 to 0.411 in the last 10 rounds of the ﬁrst phase.
13The coeﬃcient for belief as explanatory variable for subjects’ contributions changes from
0.704 in round 1-10 to 0.685 in the last 10 rounds of the ﬁrst phase.
14The original instruction was: “Please note: The feedback on the others’ average contribution
in phase 1 was at least as high as your own contribution in each of the 20 periods. In phase
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IF no sucker treatment subjects cannot exactly calculate the percentage of the
exaggeration because others’ contributions are not multiplied by an absolute
number but depend on the subject’s own contribution. Nevertheless, in phase
2 subjects know that actual contributions might be lower than announced and
therefore should discount their contributions.
The comparison of the ﬁrst and the second phase shows that contributions in
the IF no sucker treatment signiﬁcantly decline if the exaggeration mechanism
is revealed (p < 0.001). However, the cooperation is still signiﬁcantly higher
in the IF no sucker treatment than in the PF treatment (p < 0.001) in the
second phase.
Assuming that this way of exaggerating the feedback increases cooperation
despite uncertainty, we expect that subjects evaluate the exaggeration posi-
tively from a monetary but negatively from a moral point of view.
Both moral and monetary judgments of the exaggeration are signiﬁcantly
better in the IF no sucker treatment than in the IF25 treatment (p < 0.05 and
p < 0.05). The moral and the monetary evaluation of the exaggerated feedback
in IF no sucker are again not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.955). Instead,
moral and monetary evaluations are signiﬁcantly correlated (r = 0.515, p <
0.001). The fact that not only the monetary but also the moral evaluation
of the exaggeration is better in the IF no sucker treatment and that the two
evaluations are correlated suggests that subjects do not regard the exaggeration
as bad anymore as soon as their proﬁt is higher. Apparently, subjects realized
that the exaggeration mechanism induced more cooperation and appreciated
this positive eﬀect. In other words in this case the end seems to justify the
means.
Beliefs in IF no sucker
The diﬀerence between beliefs and contributions (see Figure 4.9) in the ﬁrst
phase is also signiﬁcantly larger in the IF no sucker treatment than in the PF
treatment (p < 0.001). The information structure from round 1 to round 20 is
the same in IF no sucker and in IF25 because subjects know that the feedback
they receive might not be true but they do not know in what way. Subjects
consider this uncertainty in their contribution decision by making a discount
2 will the information about the average contribution of the other three members of your
group in the previous period also be at least as high as your own contribution in each of the
20 periods.”
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from what they believe that their partners contribute.
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Figure 4.9: The diﬀerence between belief and contribution in IF no sucker in
phase 1 and 2
In phase 2, subjects in IF no sucker behave diﬀerently from subjects in
IF25. In IF no sucker, the diﬀerence between beliefs and contributions remains
from phase 1 to phase 2 (p = 0.146). Assuming that uncertainty is the major
reason for the discount from beliefs to contributions as already outlined before,
this ﬁnding is not surprising. In IF no sucker the uncertainty is equivalently
present in phase 1 as in phase 2 because even after the revelation how the
exaggeration mechanism works subjects were by design not able to calculate
the actual average contribution of the other group members.
4.5 Conclusion
We study whether the attempt to “paint the world pink” helps to overcome
the conﬂict between individual and collective payoﬀ maximization in a social
dilemma situation and analyze the eﬀects in the long run. Assuming that
people are conditional cooperative and therefore are more likely to put eﬀort
in a task if they know that other group members do so, too, we sugarcoated
the feedback about other group members’ contributions in a public-good game.
Our results show that as long as there is uncertainty about the reliability
of the feedback, a uniform exaggeration of 25% about other people’s average
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contributions does not increase cooperation above the level reached in a control
treatment without uncertainty about the reliability of the feedback on group
members’ contributions.
We also ﬁnd that uncertainty not only alters average contributions but also
the way how subjects form their beliefs about other players’ contributions.
At the same time the importance of beliefs and contribution preferences as
explanatory variables for contributions is reversed under uncertain feedback
conditions.
The diﬀerent contribution adjustments of those subjects who felt exploited
by others and those who exploited their group members seems to be an al-
ternative explanation for the downward shift in repeated social dilemma situ-
ations. While imperfect conditional cooperation as presented by Fischbacher
and Gächter (2010) implies some sort of selﬁshness our observations suggest
that players’ decision to contribute less than the average is a result of (or an
answer to) disappointing feedback.
In the long run, after the announcement of actual contributions, a further
application of the uniform exaggeration mechanism leads to an even stronger
decline in cooperation. The exaggeration is much more eﬀective if it is done
contingently on each subjects’ own contribution, i.e. if no person feels to
be exploited by others. In that case, stable cooperation can be established
and even remains high once the exaggeration mechanism has become common
knowledge. Additionally, this mechanism is more eﬃcient in terms of possible
exaggeration costs because the necessary amount of exaggeration is smaller.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 The eﬀect of observation and rewards on
cooperation (Chapter 1)
A.1.1 Instructions
(translated from German)
General Information: You are a member of a group with four members.
During the whole experiment you will only interact with the members of your
group. The experiment consists of 20 rounds. At the end of the ﬁrst period
as well as at the end of all following rounds the group has to decide whether
they hire a manager for the following round. The manager observes the group
members’ contributions and rewards those group members with the highest
contributions. Hiring a manager creates costs.
Procedure: The experiment consists of 20 periods and every period consists
of two stages.
Stage 1: Every group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens at the
beginning of every period. You have to decide how many tokens you contribute
to the group project. The remaining tokens are paid to your private account.
The group result is 1.6 times the sum of contributions from all group members.
The part of the group result that exceeds the sum of members’ contributions is
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called surplus. Therefore the surplus is 0.6 times the sum of contributions. At
the end of stage 1 you will receive information about the sum of contributions
and your own payoﬀ for this period. If the manager was appointed in this
period, you will receive information about the allocation of the surplus and
the costs of management.
Stage 2: The members of the group vote for or against the appointment of
a manager in the following period. The manager will be appointed if three
out of four members vote for him. Otherwise the manager will not be ap-
pointed. After every group member casted his/her vote the voting result will
be announced.
The manager: The manager is not selected from the group members. The
manager is an automated agent that decides according to the following rules.
The manager observes the sum of contributions and the contributions of two
out of four group members. The observed group members are randomly cho-
sen. The choice is independent from former and future choices. It is also
independent from the group members’ voting and contribution decision. The
manager guesses the remaining (unobserved) contributions by assuming that
both are equal. [M4: The manager observes the sum of contributions and the
contributions of each group member.]
Example: Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4
Contribution: 5 7 11 17
Managers’ guess:
Sum of contributions: 5 + 7 + 11 + 17 = 40
Observed contributions: 7 + 11 = 18
Guess of unobserved contributions (40 - 18) / 2 = 11
Guessed contribution: 11 7 11 11
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The manager allocates the surplus (deducting the manager costs) to the
group member with the highest contribution. If there is more than one group
member with the highest contribution, the surplus (deducting the manager
costs) is divided equally among these group members.
The manager costs are 0.2 [M4: 0.4] times the sum of contributions and are
deduced from the surplus. The remaining surplus is therefore 0.4 [M4: 0.2]
times the sum of contributions.
Calculation of payoﬀ (period): The sum of contributions is always equally
divided among the group members.
If the manager is appointed the payoﬀs are calculated as follows:
The group member(s) with the highest contribution receive(s):
Payoﬀ = 20 - contribution + sum of contributions / 4
+ 0.4 x sum of contributions / number of members with highest contribution
The other group member(s) receive(s):
Payoﬀ = 20 - contribution + sum of contributions / 4
+ 0.4 x sum of contributions / number of members with highest contribution
If the manager is not appointed the payoﬀs are calculated as follows:
Payoﬀ = 20 - contribution + 1.6 x sum of contributions / 4
Total payoﬀ: Your total payoﬀ from the experiment is the sum of payoﬀs
from the 20 periods. At the end of the experiment your total payoﬀ will be
converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro per 70 tokens.
Please note: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment.
If you have a question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions
are made anonymously, i.e. no other participant is informed about the identity
of someone who made a certain decision. The payment is anonymous too, i.e.
no participant learns what the payoﬀ of another participant is.
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A.1.2 Incentives
The incentive to contribute marginally above the second-best player (if the
manager is appointed) arises if:
(M4) Πi = ei + 0.25C−i < Π∗i = ei − ci + (0.25 + 0.2)(C−i + ci)
(M2) Πi = ei + 0.25C−i < Π∗i = ei − ci + (0.25 + 0.4)(C−i + ci)
Simpliﬁed to:
(M4) 0.25C−i < −0.45ci + 0.45C−i
(M2) 0.25C−i < −0.35ci + 0.65C−i
And solved for C−i:
(M4) C−i > 2.75ci
(M2) C−i > .875ci
A second condition is necessary (in both treatments) to ensure that the
player is the only top contributor: ci > max(cj1, cj2, cj3). If both conditions
are fulﬁlled the player receives the higher payoﬀ Π∗i
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A.1.3 Panel regression (I) on contribution in M4
Dv: contribution Spec I (N = 608) Spec II (N = 608)
Round -0.169*** (0.039) -0.169*** (0.39)
First contribution 0.666*** (0.128) 0.664*** (0.129)
Feedback 0.046 (0.048) 0.047 (0.059)
Manager 3.269*** (0.616)
Vote for hired manager 3.459*** (0.414)
Vote against hired manager 2.651*** (1.580)
Cons 2.862*** (1.098) 2.875*** (1.101)
R2 0.33 0.33
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clusters in
groups) in parentheses,* sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
The Wald-test rejects the H0 of equal coeﬃcients (Vote for the hired manager
and Vote against the hired manager) at the 5% level. We forego the interpre-
tation of this data because of the small number of observations with manager
in M4.
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A.1.4 Panel regression (II) on contribution in M4
Dv: contribution M4 without manager M4 with manager
(N = 536) (N = 104)
Round -0.152*** (0.036) -0.311 (0.076)
Cons 7.919*** (0.739) 12.402*** (1.767)
Notes: GLS panel regression, random eﬀects, robust errors (6 clusters in
groups) in parentheses, * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at %.
The Wald-test does not reject the H0 of equal coeﬃcients (Vote for the hired
manager and Vote against the hired manager) at the 10% level. We forego the
interpretation of this data because of the small number (104) of observations
with manager in M4.
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A.1.5 Probit-regression on individual voting decisions
Dv: contribution M2 (N = 608) M4 (N = 608)
Round 0.017* (0.039) 0.169 (0.39)
First voting decision 0.323*** (0.111) 0.747*** (0.162)
Manager in current round -0.220** (0.110) -0.173** (0.143)
Feedback -0.029*** (0.016) -0.034** (0.008)
Cons 0.271*** (0.191) 0.066*** (0.211)
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors in brackets. (LR χ2 =
18.25; Prob > χ2 = 0.001; signiﬁcance level: *10% **5% ***1%) We forego
the interpretation of the data from M4 because of the small number (104) of
observations with manager in M4.
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A.2 The eﬀect of feedback on conditional co-
operation (Chapter 2)
A.2.1 Instructions
(translated from German)
General Information: You are a member of a group that consists of four
members. During the whole experiment you will only interact with the mem-
bers of your group.
Procedure: The experiment consists of 3 phases and every phase consists
of 10 periods. Every group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens
at the beginning of each period. You have to decide how many tokens you
contribute to the group project. The remaining tokens are paid to your private
account. All points that have been contributed to the public good will be
multiplied by the factor 1.6 and equally split among all 4 players, i.e. every
player receives 0.4 (=1.6/4) for each point that has been contributed to the
public good by a player. At the end of the 10th, 20th and 30th period you will
receive information about:
• your average contributions and payoﬀ in the last 10 periods
• the average contributions of the other 3 group members in the last 10
periods
Calculation of payoﬀ per period: Your payoﬀ in each round consists of
two parts:
• Points that you did not contribute
• Your share of the public good
Payoﬀ per period
= your endowment (20) - your contribution + sum of contributions
+ sum of contributions x 1.6/4
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Total payoﬀ: Your total payoﬀ from the experiment is the sum of payoﬀs
from the 20 periods. At the end of the experiment your total payoﬀ will be
converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro per 70 tokens.
Please note: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment.
If you have a question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions
are made anonymously, i.e. no other participant is informed about the identity
of someone who made a certain decision. The payment is anonymous too, i.e.
no participant learns what the payoﬀ of another participant is.
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A.3 Feedback and leading by example (Chap-
ter 3)
A.3.1 Instructions
(translated from German)
General Information: The experiment consists of two phases. First you
will be informed about phase 1. Instructions for phase 2 will be announced
after the end of phase 1. Your decisions in phase 1 will neither have any
inﬂuence on the possibilities of your decisions nor on your payoﬀs in phase 2.
Information for phase 1: You are member of a group that consists of 4
members in total. During phase 1, you will only interact with members of
your group. Phase 1 consists of 20 periods. The structure of all rounds is
identical. Every group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens at the
beginning of each period. You have to decide how many tokens you contribute
to the group project. The remaining tokens are paid to your private account.
All points that have been contributed to the public good will be multiplied by
the factor 1.6 and equally split among all 4 players, i.e. every player receives
0.4 (=1.6/4) for each point that has been contributed to the public good by
a player. Points that have not been contributed to the public good are kept
by the player.
Calculation of payoﬀ per period: Your payoﬀ in each round consists of
two parts:
• Points that you did not contribute
• Your share of the public good
Payoﬀ per period
= your endowment (20) - your contribution + sum of contributions
+ sum of contributions x 1.6/4
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Selection of the early contributor: At the beginning of the experiment
each group member guesses the average contributions of the other 3 group
members and states his/her own contribution.
The group member with the smallest deviation between his/her guess and
the actual contribution of the other group members is selected as the early
contributor. If there is more than one best guess, the early contributor is
randomly selected.
You will see on your screen whether you are selected as the ﬁrst mover or
not.
The ﬁrst mover is selected for the entire ﬁrst phase.
Procedure for phase 1:
1. The early contributor decides about his/her own contribution.
2. Being informed about the decision of the early contributor, the other
group members decide simultaneously and privately about their own con-
tribution.
3. The early contributor [FI: each member] receives information about the
average contributions of the other group members and the own payoﬀ.
Total payoﬀ: Your total payoﬀ from phase 1 is the sum of payoﬀs from the
20 periods. At the end of the experiment your total payoﬀ will be converted
into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro per 90 tokens.
Please note: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment.
If you have a question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions
are made anonymously, i.e. no other participant is informed about the identity
of someone who made a certain decision. The payment is anonymous too, i.e.
no participant learns what the payoﬀ of another participant is.
Information for phase 2: Phase 2 consists of another 20 periods of the
game you played in phase 1. The members of your group will not change. All
group members decide simultaneously and privately about their own contribu-
tion. There is no early contributor. At the end of each period you will receive
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information about the average contributions of the other group members and
your own payoﬀ.
Income from phase 2: Your total income from phase 2 is the sum of payoﬀs
of all periods. At the end of the experiment your total income from phase 2
will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro for 90 points.
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A.3.2 Average distances between leader and follower
contributions
Overall 1st half 2nd half Diﬀerence
Round 1-20 1-10 11- 20 1st vs. 2nd
Full information 1.56 1.50 1.61 -0.11
Private information 0.83 0.90 0.76 -0.24
Diﬀerence 0.73 0.60 0.85
Notes: The diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant according to a Mann-Whitney-U-
Test for independent samples (diﬀerences in columns) and a Wilcoxon-Test for
related ones (diﬀerences in rows).
A.3.3 Standard deviation in contribution decisions
Overall 1st half 2nd half Diﬀerence
Round 1-20 1-10 11- 20 1st vs. 2nd
Full information 6.94 6.51 7.41 -0.09
Private information 5.93 5.78 5.68 -0.10
Diﬀerence 1.01 0.73 1.73
Notes: The diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant according to a Mann-Whitney-U-
Test for independent samples (diﬀerences in columns) and a Wilcoxon-Test for
related ones (diﬀerences in rows).
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A.4 The eﬀects of uncertainty and exagger-
ated feedback (Chapter 4)
A.4.1 Instructions
(translated from German)
General Information: The experiment consists of two phases. First you
will be informed about phase 1. Instructions for phase 2 will be announced
after the end of phase 1. Your decisions in phase 1 will neither have any
inﬂuence on the possibilities of your decisions nor on your payoﬀs in phase 2.
Information for phase 1: You are member of a group that consists of 4
members in total. During phase 1, you will only interact with members of your
group.
Procedure of phase 1: Contributions of group members
• Phase 1 consists of 20 periods. The structure of all rounds is identical.
• In each period every player receives an endowment of 20 points.
• Every player has to decide how many of the 20 points he/she wants to
contribute to the public good.
• All points that have been contributed to the public good will be multi-
plied by the factor 1.6 and equally split among all 4 players, i.e. every
player receives 0.4 (=1.6/4) for each point that has been contributed
to the public good by a player.
• Points that have not been contributed to the public good are kept by the
player.
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Information about other group members’ contributions: From the
beginning of the second period you will be informed about the average con-
tribution of the other three members of your group in the previous period at
the beginning of each period.
Pleas note: that this information might deviate from the actual
contribution!
Calculation of the payoﬀ per period: Your payoﬀ in each round consists
of two parts:
• Points that you did not contribute
• Your share of the public good
Payoﬀ per period
= your endowment (20) - your contribution + sum of contributions
+ sum of contributions x 1.6/4
Example for the case, that you contributed 10 and the other three mem-
bers of your group contributed 12, 8 and 4 points:
= (20 - 10) + (10 + 12 + 8 + 4) x 1.6 / 4
= 10 + 13.6
= 23.6
Total income from phase 1: Your total income from phase 1 is the sum
of payoﬀs of all periods. At the end of the experiment your total income from
phase 1 will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro for 80
points.
Please note: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment.
If you have a question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions
are made anonymously, i.e. no other participant is informed about the identity
of someone who made a certain decision. The payment is anonymous too, i.e.
no participant learns what the payoﬀ of another participant is.
Information for phase 2: Phase 2 consists of another 20 periods of the
game you played in phase 1. The members of your group will not change.
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[IF 0] Please note! The feedback on the others’ average contribution in
phase 1 corresponded to the actual average contribution in each of
the 20 periods.
In phase 2 the information about the average contribution of the other
three members of your group in the previous period will also correspond to
the average of the actual contribution in each of the 20 periods.
[IF 25] Please note! The feedback on the others’ average contribution
in phase 1 was by 25% higher than the actual average contribution in each
of the 20 periods.
In phase 2 the information about the average contribution of the other
three members of your group in the previous period will also be by 25%
higher than the actual average contribution in each of the 20 periods.
[IF no sucker] Please note! The feedback on the others’ average con-
tribution in phase 1 was at least as high as your own contribution in
each of the 20 periods.
In phase 2 the information about the average contribution of the other
three members of your group in the previous period will also be at least as
high as your own contribution in each of the 20 periods.
Total income from phase 2: Your total income from phase 1 is the sum
of payoﬀs of all periods. At the end of the experiment your total income from
phase 1 will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro for 80
points.
Total income from phase 1 and phase 2: Your total income from phase 1
and phase 2 is the sum of payoﬀs of both phases. At the end of the experiment
your total income will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Euro
for 80 points.
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A.4.2 Feedback screen
(translated from German)
